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Abstract
In the near future, there will likely be special-purpose quantum computers with 40-50 high-quality
qubits. This paper lays general theoretical foundations for how to use such devices to demonstrate
“quantum supremacy”: that is, a clear quantum speedup for some task, motivated by the goal of over-
turning the Extended Church-Turing Thesis as confidently as possible.
First, we study the hardness of sampling the output distribution of a random quantum circuit, along
the lines of a recent proposal by the Quantum AI group at Google. We show that there’s a natu-
ral average-case hardness assumption, which has nothing to do with sampling, yet implies that no
polynomial-time classical algorithm can pass a statistical test that the quantum sampling procedure’s
outputs do pass. Compared to previous work—for example, on BosonSampling and IQP—the central
advantage is that we can now talk directly about the observed outputs, rather than about the distribution
being sampled.
Second, in an attempt to refute our hardness assumption, we give a new algorithm, inspired by Sav-
itch’s Theorem, for simulating a general quantum circuit with n qubits and depth d in polynomial space
and dO(n) time. We then discuss why this and other known algorithms fail to refute our assumption.
Third, resolving an open problem of Aaronson and Arkhipov, we show that any strong quantum
supremacy theorem—of the form “if approximate quantum sampling is classically easy, then the poly-
nomial hierarchy collapses”—must be non-relativizing. This sharply contrasts with the situation for
exact sampling.
Fourth, refuting a conjecture by Aaronson and Ambainis, we show that there is a sampling task,
namely Fourier Sampling, with a 1 versus linear separation between its quantum and classical query
complexities.
Fifth, in search of a “happy medium” between black-box and non-black-box arguments, we study
quantum supremacy relative to oracles in P/poly. Previous work implies that, if one-way functions exist,
then quantum supremacy is possible relative to such oracles. We show, conversely, that some computa-
tional assumption is needed: if SampBPP = SampBQP and NP ⊆ BPP, then quantum supremacy is
impossible relative to oracles with small circuits.
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1 Introduction
The Extended Church-Turing Thesis, or ECT, asserts that every physical process can be simulated by a
deterministic or probabilistic Turing machine with at most polynomial overhead. Since the 1980s—and
certainly since the discovery of Shor’s algorithm [Sho97] in the 1990s—computer scientists have understood
that quantum mechanics might refute the ECT in principle. Today, there are actual experiments being
planned (e.g., [BIS+16]) with the goal of severely challenging the ECT in practice. These experiments
don’t yet aim to build full, fault-tolerant, universal quantum computers, but “merely” to demonstrate some
quantum speedup over the best known or conjectured classical algorithms, for some possibly-contrived task,
as confidently as possible. In other words, the goal is to answer the skeptics [Kal11, Lev03] who claim
that genuine quantum speedups are either impossible in theory, or at any rate, are hopelessly out of reach
technologically. Recently, the term “quantum supremacy” has come into vogue for such experiments,1
although the basic goal goes back several decades, to the beginning of quantum computing itself.
Before going further, we should address some common misunderstandings about quantum supremacy.
The ECT is an asymptotic claim, which of course means that no finite experiment could render a decisive
verdict on it, even in principle. But this hardly makes experiments irrelevant. If
(1) a quantum device performed some task (say) 1015 times faster than a highly optimized simulation
written by “adversaries” and running on a classical computing cluster, with the quantum/classical gap
appearing to increase exponentially with the instance size across the whole range tested, and
(2) this observed performance closely matched theoretical results that predicted such an exponential quan-
tum speedup for the task in question, and
(3) all other consistency checks passed (for example: removing quantum behavior from the experimental
device destroyed the observed speedup),
this would obviously “raise the stakes” for anyone who still believed the ECT! Indeed, when some quantum
computing researchers have criticized previous claims to have experimentally achieved quantum speedups
(see, e.g., [Aar15]), it has typically been on the ground that, in those researchers’ view, the experiments
failed to meet one or more of the conditions above.
It’s sometimes claimed that any molecule in Nature or the laboratory, for which chemists find it compu-
tationally prohibitive to solve the Schro¨dinger equation and calculate its ground state, already provides an
example of “quantum supremacy.” The idea, in other words, is that such a molecule constitutes a “useful
quantum computer, for the task of simulating itself.”
For us, the central problem with this idea is that in theoretical computer science, we care less about
individual instances than about solving problems (i.e., infinite collections of instances) in a more-or-less
uniform way. For any one molecule, the difficulty in simulating classically it might reflect genuine asymp-
totic hardness, but it might also reflect other issues (e.g., a failure to exploit special structure in the molecule,
or the same issues of modeling error, constant-factor overheads, and so forth that arise even in simulations
of classical physics).
Thus, while it’s possible that complex molecules could form the basis for a convincing quantum supremacy
demonstration, we believe more work would need to be done. In particular, one would want a device that
could synthesize any molecule in some theoretically infinite class—and one would then want complexity-
theoretic evidence that the general problem, of simulating a given molecule from that class, is asymptotically
hard for a classical computer. And in such a case, it would seem more natural to call the synthesis machine
the “quantum computer,” rather than the molecules themselves!
1As far as we know, the first person to use the term in print was John Preskill [Pre12].
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In summary, we regard quantum supremacy as a central milestone for quantum computing that hasn’t
been reached yet, but that might be reached in the near future. This milestone is essentially negative in
character: it has no obvious signature of the sort familiar to experimental physics, since it simply amounts
to the nonexistence of an efficient classical algorithm to simulate a given quantum process. For that reason,
the tools of theoretical computer science will be essential to understand when quantum supremacy has or
hasn’t been achieved. So in our view, even if it were uninteresting as TCS, there would still be an urgent
need for TCS to contribute to the discussion about which quantum supremacy experiments to do, how to
verify their results, and what should count as convincing evidence that classical simulation is hard. Happily,
it turns out that there is a great deal here of intrinsic TCS interest as well.
1.1 Supremacy from Sampling
In recent years, a realization has crystallized that, if our goal is to demonstrate quantum supremacy (rather
than doing anything directly useful), then there are good reasons to shift our attention from decision and
function problems to sampling problems: that is, problems where the goal is to sample an n-bit string, either
exactly or approximately, from a desired probability distribution.
A first reason for this is that demonstrating quantum supremacy via a sampling problem doesn’t appear
to require the full strength of a universal quantum computer. Indeed, there are now at least a half-dozen
proposals [AA13, BJS10, FH16, TD04, MFF14, JVdN14, ABKM16] for special-purpose devices that could
efficiently solve sampling problems believed to be classically intractable, without being able to solve every
problem in the class BQP, or for that matter even every problem in P. Besides their intrinsic physical
and mathematical interest, these intermediate models might be easier to realize than a universal quantum
computer. In particular, because of their simplicity, they might let us avoid the need for the full machinery
of quantum fault-tolerance [ABO97]: something that adds a theoretically polylogarithmic but enormous-in-
practice overhead to quantum computation. Thus, many researchers now expect that the first convincing
demonstration of quantum supremacy will come via this route.
A second reason to focus on sampling problems is more theoretical: in the present state of complexity
theory, we can arguably be more confident that certain quantum sampling problems really are classically
hard, than we are that factoring (for example) is classically hard, or even that BPP 6= BQP. Already in
2002, Terhal and DiVincenzo [TD04] noticed that, while constant-depth quantum circuits can’t solve any
classically intractable decision problems,2 they nevertheless have a curious power: namely, they can sample
probability distributions that can’t be sampled in classical polynomial time, unless BQP ⊆ AM, which
would be a surprising inclusion of complexity classes. Then, in 2004, Aaronson showed that PostBQP =
PP, where PostBQP means BQP with the ability to postselect on exponentially-unlikely measurement
outcomes. This had the immediate corollary that, if there’s an efficient classical algorithm to sample the
output distribution of an arbitrary quantum circuit—or for that matter, any distribution whose probabilities
are multiplicatively close to the correct ones—then
PP = PostBQP = PostBPP ⊆ BPPNP.
By Toda’s Theorem [Tod91], this implies that the polynomial hierarchy collapses to the third level.
Related to that, in 2009, Aaronson [Aar10] showed that, while it was (and remains) a notorious open
problem to construct an oracle relative to which BQP 6⊂ PH, one can construct oracular sampling and rela-
tion problems that are solvable in quantum polynomial time, but that are provably not solvable in randomized
polynomial time augmented with a PH oracle.
Then, partly inspired by that oracle separation, Aaronson and Arkhipov [AA13] proposed BosonSampling:
a model that uses identical photons traveling through a network of beamsplitters and phaseshifters to solve
2This is because any qubit output by such a circuit depends on at most a constant number of input qubits.
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classically hard sampling problems. Aaronson and Arkhipov proved that a polynomial-time exact classi-
cal simulation of BosonSampling would collapse PH. They also gave a plausible conjecture implying
that even an approximate simulation would have the same consequence. Around the same time, Bremner,
Jozsa, and Shepherd [BJS10] independently proposed the Commuting Hamiltonians or IQP (“Instantaneous
Quantum Polynomial-Time”) model, and showed that it had the same property, that exact classical simula-
tion would collapse PH. Later, Bremner, Montanaro, and Shepherd [BMS15, BMS16] showed that, just
like for BosonSampling, there are plausible conjectures under which even a fast classical approximate
simulation of the IQP model would collapse PH.
Since then, other models have been proposed with similar behavior. To take a few examples: Farhi and
Harrow [FH16] showed that the so-called Quantum Approximate Optimization Algorithm, or QAOA, can
sample distributions that are classically intractable unless PH collapses. Morimae, Fujii, and Fitzsimons
[MFF14] showed the same for the so-called One Clean Qubit or DQC1 model, while Jozsa and Van den
Nest [JVdN14] showed it for stabilizer circuits with magic initial states and nonadaptive measurements, and
Aaronson et al. [ABKM16] showed it for a model based on integrable particle scattering in 1+1 dimensions.
In retrospect, the constant-depth quantum circuits considered by Terhal and DiVincenzo [TD04] also have
the property that fast exact classical simulation would collapse PH.
Within the last four years, quantum supremacy via sampling has made the leap from complexity theory
to a serious experimental prospect. For example, there have by now been many small-scale demonstra-
tions of BosonSampling in linear-optical systems, with the current record being a 6-photon experiment by
Carolan et al. [CHS+15]. To scale up to (say) 30 or 40 photons—as would be needed to make a classical
simulation of the experiment suitably difficult—seems to require more reliable single-photon sources than
exist today. But some experts (e.g., [Rud16, PGHAG15]) are optimistic that optical multiplexing, super-
conducting resonators, or other technologies currently under development will lead to such photon sources.
In the meantime, as we mentioned earlier, Boixo et al. [BIS+16] have publicly detailed a plan, currently
underway at Google, to perform a quantum supremacy experiment involving random circuits applied to
a 2D array of 40-50 coupled superconducting qubits. So far, the group at Google has demonstrated the
preparation and measurement of entangled states on a linear array of 9 superconducting qubits [KBF+15].
1.2 Theoretical Challenges
Despite the exciting recent progress in both theory and experiment, some huge conceptual problems have
remained about sampling-based quantum supremacy. These problems are not specific to any one quantum
supremacy proposal (such as BosonSampling, IQP, or random quantum circuits), but apply with minor
variations to all of them.
Verification of Quantum Supremacy Experiments. From the beginning, there was the problem of
how to verify the results of a sampling-based quantum supremacy experiment. In contrast to (say) factoring
and discrete log, for sampling tasks such as BosonSampling, it seems unlikely that there’s any NP witness
certifying the quantum experiment’s output, let alone anNPwitness that’s also the experimental output itself.
Rather, for the sampling tasks, not only simulation but even verification might need classical exponential
time. Yet, while no one has yet discovered a general way around this,3 it’s far from the fatal problem that
some have imagined. The reason is simply that experiments can and will target a “sweet spot,” of (say)
40-50 qubits, for which classical simulation and verification of the results is difficult but not impossible.
Still, the existing verification methods have a second drawback. Namely, once we’ve fixed a specific
verification test for sampling from a probability distributionD, we ought to consider, not merely all classical
3In principle, one could use so-called authenticated quantum computing [ABOE08, BFK09], but the known schemes for that
might be much harder to realize technologically than a basic quantum supremacy experiment, and in any case, they all presuppose
the validity of quantum mechanics.
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algorithms that sample exactly or approximately from D, but all classical algorithms that output anything
that passes the verification test. To put it differently, we ought to talk not about the sampling problem itself,
but about an associated relation problem: that is, a problem where the goal is to produce any output that
satisfies a given condition.
As it happens, in 2011, Aaronson [Aar14] proved an extremely general connection between sampling
problems and relation problems. Namely, given any approximate sampling problem S, he showed how to
define a relation problem RS such that, for every “reasonable” model of computation (classical, quantum,
etc.), RS is efficiently solvable in that model if and only if S is. This had the corollary that
SampBPP = SampBQP ⇐⇒ FBPP = FBQP,
where SampBPP and SampBQP are the classes of approximate sampling problems solvable in polyno-
mial time by randomized and quantum algorithms respectively, and FBPP and FBQP are the corresponding
classes of relation problems. Unfortunately, Aaronson’s construction of RS involved Kolmogorov com-
plexity: basically, one asks for an m-tuple of strings, 〈x1, . . . , xm〉, such that
K (x1, . . . , xm) ≥ log2
1
p1 · · · pm −O (1) ,
where pi is the desired probability of outputting xi in the sampling problem. And of course, verifying such
a condition is extraordinarily difficult, even more so than calculating the probabilities p1, . . . , pm.4 For
this reason, it’s strongly preferable to have a condition that talks only about the largeness of the pi’s, and
not about the algorithmic randomness of the xi’s. But then hardness for the sampling problem no longer
necessarily implies hardness for the relation problem, so a new argument is needed.
Supremacy Theorems for Approximate Sampling. A second difficulty is that any quantum sampling
device is subject to noise and decoherence. Ultimately, of course, we’d like hardness results for quan-
tum sampling that apply even in the presence of experimentally realistic errors. Very recently, Bremner,
Montanaro, and Shepherd [BMS16] and Fujii [Fuj16] have taken some promising initial steps in that direc-
tion. But even if we care only about the smallest “experimentally reasonable” error—namely, an error that
corrupts the output distribution D to some other distribution D′ that’s ε-close to D in variation distance—
Aaronson and Arkhipov [AA13] found that we already engage substantial new open problems in complexity
theory, if we want evidence for classical hardness. So for example, their hardness argument for approximate
BosonSampling depended on the conjecture that there’s no BPPNP algorithm to estimate the permanent of
an i.i.d. Gaussian matrix A ∼ N (0, 1)n×nC , with high probability over the choice of A.
Of course, one could try to close that loophole by proving that this Gaussian permanent estimation
problem is #P-hard, which is indeed a major challenge that Aaronson and Arkhipov left open. But
this situation also raises more general questions. For example, is there an implication of the form “if
SampBPP = SampBQP, then PH collapses,” where again SampBPP and SampBQP are the approximate
sampling versions of BPP and BQP respectively? Are there oracles relative to which such an implication
does not hold?
Quantum Supremacy Relative to Oracles. A third problem goes to perhaps the core issue of complex-
ity theory (both quantum and classical): namely, we don’t at present have a proof of P 6= PSPACE, much
less of BPP 6= BQP or SampBPP 6= SampBQP, less still of the hardness of specific problems like factoring
or estimating Gaussian permanents. So what reason do we have to believe that any of these problems are
hard? Part of the evidence has always come from oracle results, which we often can prove unconditionally.
4Furthermore, this is true even if we substitute a resource-bounded Kolmogorov complexity, as Aaronson’s result allows.
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Particularly in quantum complexity theory, oracle separations can already be highly nontrivial, and give us
a deep intuition for why all the “standard” algorithmic approaches fail for some problem.
On the other hand, we also know, from results like IP = PSPACE [Sha92], that oracle separations can
badly mislead us about what happens in the unrelativized world. Generally speaking, we might say, relying
on an oracle separation is more dangerous, the less the oracle function resembles what would actually be
available in an explicit problem.5
In the case of sampling-based quantum supremacy, we’ve known strong oracle separations since early in
the subject. Indeed, in 2009, Aaronson [Aar10] showed that Fourier Sampling—a quantumly easy sam-
pling problem that involves only a random oracle—requires classical exponential time, and for that matter,
sits outside the entire polynomial hierarchy. But of course, in real life random oracles are unavailable.
So a question arises: can we say anything about the classical hardness of Fourier Sampling with a pseu-
dorandom oracle? More broadly, what hardness results can we prove for quantum sampling, relative to
oracles that are efficiently computable? Here, we imagine that an algorithm doesn’t have access to a suc-
cinct representation of the oracle function f , but it does know that a succinct representation exists (i.e., that
f ∈ P/poly). Under that assumption, is there any hope of proving an unconditional separation between
quantum and classical sampling? If not, then can we at least prove quantum supremacy under weaker (or
more “generic”) assumptions than would be needed in the purely computational setting?
1.3 Our Contributions
In this paper, we address all three of the above challenges. Our results might look wide-ranging, but they’re
held together by a single thread: namely, the quest to understand the classical hardness of quantum ap-
proximate sampling problems, and especially the meta-question of under which computational assumptions
such hardness can be proven. We’ll be interested in both “positive” results, of the form “quantum sampling
problem X is classically hard under assumption Y ,” and “negative” results, of the form “proving the clas-
sical hardness of X requires assumption Y .” Also, we’ll be less concerned with specific proposals such as
BosonSampling, than simply with the general task of approximately sampling the output distribution of
a given quantum circuit C. Fortuitously, though, our focus on quantum circuit sampling will make some
of our results an excellent fit to currently planned experiments—most notably, those at Google [BIS+16],
which will involve random quantum circuits on a 2D square lattice of 40 to 50 superconducting qubits.
Even though we won’t address the details of those or other experiments, our results (together with other
recent work [BIS+16, BMS16]) can help to inform the experiments—for example, by showing how the
circuit depth, the verification test applied to the outputs, and other design choices affect the strength of the
computational assumptions that are necessary and sufficient to conclude that quantum supremacy has been
achieved.
We have five main results.
The Hardness of Quantum Circuit Sampling. Our first result, in Section 3, is about the hardness of
sampling the output distribution of a random quantum circuit, along the general lines of the planned Google
experiment. Specifically, we propose a simple verification test to apply to the outputs of a random quantum
circuit. We then analyze the classical hardness of generating any outputs that pass that test.
More concretely, we study the following basic problem:
Problem 1 (HOG, or Heavy Output Generation). Given as input a random quantum circuit C (drawn from
some suitable ensemble), generate output strings x1, . . . , xk, at least a 2/3 fraction of which have greater
than the median probability in C’s output distribution.
5Indeed, the algebrization barrier of Aaronson and Wigderson [AW09] was based on precisely this insight: namely, if we force
oracles to be “more realistic,” by demanding (in that case) that they come equipped with algebraic extensions of whichever Boolean
functions they represent, then many previously non-relativizing results become relativizing.
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HOG is a relation problem, for which we can verify a claimed solution in classical exponential time, by
calculating the ideal probabilities px1 , . . . , pxk for each xi to be generated by C, and then checking whether
enough of the pxi’s are greater than the median value (which we can estimate analytically to extremely
high confidence). Furthermore, HOG is easy to solve on a quantum computer, with overwhelming success
probability, by the obvious strategy of just running C over and over and collecting k of its outputs.6
It certainly seems plausible that HOG is exponentially hard for a classical computer. But we ask: under
what assumption could that hardness be proven? To address that question, we propose a new hardness
assumption:
Assumption 1 (QUATH, or the QUAntum THreshold assumption). There is no polynomial-time classi-
cal algorithm that takes as input a description of a random quantum circuit C, and that guesses whether
|〈0n|C|0n〉|2 is greater or less than the median of all 2n of the |〈0n|C|x〉|2 values, with success probability
at least
1
2
+ Ω
(
1
2n
)
over the choice of C.
Our first result says that if QUATH is true, then HOG is hard. While this might seem nearly tautological,
the important point here is that QUATH makes no reference to sampling or relation problems. Thus, we
can now shift our focus from sampling algorithms to algorithms that simply estimate amplitudes, with a
minuscule advantage over random guessing.
New Algorithms to Simulate Quantum Circuits. But given what a tiny advantage Ω
(
2−n
)
is, why
would anyone even conjecture that QUATH might be true? This brings us to our second result, in Section
4, which is motivated by the attempt to refute QUATH. We ask: what are the best classical algorithms to
simulate an arbitrary quantum circuit? For special quantum circuits (e.g., those with mostly Clifford gates
and a few T gates [BG16]), there’s been exciting recent progress on improved exponential-time simulation
algorithms, but for arbitrary quantum circuits, one might think there isn’t much to say. Nevertheless, we do
find something basic to say that, to our knowledge, had been overlooked earlier.
For a quantum circuit with n qubits andm gates, there are two obvious simulation algorithms. The first,
which we could call the “Schro¨dinger” algorithm, stores the entire state vector in memory, using ∼ m2n
time and ∼ 2n space. The second, which we could call the “Feynman” algorithm, calculates an amplitude
as a sum of terms, using ∼ 4m time and ∼ m+ n space, as in the proof of BQP ⊆ P#P [BV97].
Now typically m  n, and the difference between m and n could matter enormously in practice. For
example, in the planned Google setup, n will be roughly 40 or 50, while m will ideally be in the thousands.
Thus, 2n time is reasonable whereas 4m time is not. So a question arises:
• When m  n, is there a classical algorithm to simulate an n-qubit, m-gate quantum circuit using
both poly (m,n) space and much less than exp (m) time—ideally, more like exp (n)?
We show an affirmative answer. In particular, inspired by the proof of Savitch’s Theorem [Sav70],
we give a recursive, sum-of-products algorithm that uses poly (m,n) space and mO(n) time—or better
yet, dO(n) time, where d is the circuit depth. We also show how to improve the running time further
for quantum circuits subject to nearest-neighbor constraints, such as the superconducting systems currently
under development. Finally, we show the existence of a “smooth tradeoff” between our algorithm and the
2n-memory Schro¨dinger algorithm. Namely, starting with the Schro¨dinger algorithm, for every desired
halving of the memory usage, one can multiply the running time by an additional factor of ∼ d.
We hope our algorithm finds some applications in quantum simulation. In the meantime, though, the
key point for this paper is that neither the Feynman algorithm, nor the Schro¨dinger algorithm, nor our new
6Heuristically, one expects the pxi ’s to be exponentially distributed random variables, which one can calculate implies that a
roughly
1 + ln 2
2
≈ 0.847 fraction of the outputs will have probabilities exceeding the median value.
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recursive algorithm come close to refuting QUATH. The Feynman algorithm fails to refute QUATH because
it yields only a 1/ exp (m) advantage over random guessing, rather than a 1/2n advantage. The Schro¨dinger
and recursive algorithms have much closer to the “correct” 2n running time, but they also fail to refute
QUATH because they don’t calculate amplitudes as straightforward sums, so don’t lead to polynomial-time
guessing algorithms at all. Thus, in asking whether we can falsify QUATH, in some sense we’re asking
how far we can go in combining the advantages of all these algorithms. This might, in turn, connect to
longstanding open problems about the optimality of Savitch’s Theorem itself (e.g., L versus NL).
Interestingly, our analysis of quantum circuit simulation algorithms explains why this paper’s hardness
argument for quantum circuit sampling, based on QUATH, would not have worked for quantum supremacy
proposals such as BosonSampling or IQP. It works only for the more general problem of quantum circuit
sampling. The reason is that for the latter, unlike for BosonSampling or IQP, there exists a parameter
m n (namely, the number of gates) that controls the advantage that a polynomial-time classical algorithm
can achieve over random guessing, even while n controls the number of possible outputs. Our analysis also
underscores the importance of taking m  n in experiments meant to show quantum supremacy, and it
provides some guidance to experimenters about the crucial question of what circuit depth they need for a
convincing quantum supremacy demonstration.
Note that, the greater the required depth, the more protected against decoherence the qubits need to
be. But the tradeoff is that the depth must be high enough that simulation algorithms that exploit limited
entanglement, such as those based on tensor networks, are ruled out. Beyond that requirement, our dO(n)
simulation algorithm gives some information about how much additional hardness one can purchase for a
given increase in depth.
Strong Quantum Supremacy Theorems Must Be Non-Relativizing. Next, in Section 5, we switch
our attention to a meta-question. Namely, what sorts of complexity-theoretic evidence we could possibly
hope to offer for SampBPP 6= SampBQP: in other words, for quantum computers being able to solve
approximate sampling problems that are hard classically? By Aaronson’s sampling/searching equivalence
theorem [Aar14], any such evidence would also be evidence for FBPP 6= FBQP (where FBPP and FBQP
are the corresponding classes of relation problems), and vice versa.
Of course, an unconditional proof of these separations is out of the question right now, since it would
imply P 6= PSPACE. Perhaps the next best thing would be to show that, if SampBPP = SampBQP, then
the polynomial hierarchy collapses. This latter is not out of the question: as we said earlier, we already
know, by a simple relativizing argument, that an equivalence between quantum and classical exact sampling
implies the collapse P#P = PH = BPPNP. Furthermore, in their work on BosonSampling, Aaronson and
Arkhipov [AA13] formulated a #P-hardness conjecture—namely, their so-called Permanent of Gaussians
Conjecture, or PGC—that if true, would imply a generalization of that collapse to the physically relevant
case of approximate sampling. More explicitly, Aaronson and Arkhipov showed that if the PGC holds, then
SampBPP = SampBQP =⇒ P#P = BPPNP. (1)
They went on to propose a program for proving the PGC, by exploiting the random self-reducibility of the
permanent. On the other hand, Aaronson and Arkhipov also explained in detail why new ideas would be
needed to complete that program, and the challenge remains open.
Subsequently, Bremner, Montanaro, and Shepherd [BMS15, BMS16] gave analogous #P-hardness con-
jectures that, if true, would also imply the implication (1), by going through the IQP model rather than
through BosonSampling.
Meanwhile, nearly two decades ago, Fortnow and Rogers [FR99] exhibited an oracle relative to which
P = BQP and yet the polynomial hierarchy is infinite. In other words, they showed that any proof of the
implication
P = BQP =⇒ PH collapses
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would have to be non-relativizing. Unfortunately, their construction was extremely specific to languages
(i.e., total Boolean functions), and didn’t even rule out the possibility that the implication
PromiseBPP = PromiseBQP =⇒ PH collapses
could be proven in a relativizing way. Thus, Aaronson and Arkhipov [AA13, see Section 10] raised the
question of which quantum supremacy theorems hold relative to all oracles.
In Section 5, we fill in the final piece needed to resolve their question, by constructing an oracle A
relative to which SampBPP = SampBQP and yet PH is infinite. In other words, we show that any strong
supremacy theorem for quantum sampling, along the lines of what Aaronson and Arkhipov [AA13] and
Bremner, Montanaro, and Shepherd [BMS15, BMS16] were seeking, must use non-relativizing techniques.
In that respect, the situation with approximate sampling is extremely different from that with exact sampling.
Perhaps it’s no surprise that one would need non-relativizing techniques to prove a strong quantum
supremacy theorem. In fact, Aaronson and Arkhipov [AA13] were originally led to study BosonSampling
precisely because of the connection between bosons and the permanent function, and the hope that one could
therefore exploit the famous non-relativizing properties of the permanent to prove hardness. All the same,
this is the first time we have explicit confirmation that non-relativizing techniques will be needed.
Maximal Quantum Supremacy for Black-Box Sampling and Relation Problems. In Section 6, we
turn our attention to the black-box model, and specifically to the question: what are the largest possible
separations between randomized and quantum query complexities for any approximate sampling or rela-
tion problem? Here we settle another open question. In 2015, Aaronson and Ambainis [AA15] studied
Fourier Sampling, in which we’re given access to a Boolean function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, and the goal is
to sample a string z with probability f̂ (z)2, where f̂ is the Boolean Fourier transform of f , normalized so
that
∑
z
f̂ (z)2 = 1. This problem is trivially solvable by a quantum algorithm with only 1 query to f . By
contrast, Aaronson and Ambainis showed that there exists a constant ε > 0 such that any classical algorithm
that solves Fourier Sampling, to accuracy ε in variation distance, requires Ω (2n/n) queries to f . They
conjectured that this lower bound was tight.
Here we refute that conjecture, by proving a Ω (2n) lower bound on the randomized query complexity
of Fourier Sampling, as long as ε is sufficiently small (say,
1
40000
). This implies that, for approximate
sampling problems, the gap between quantum and randomized query complexities can be as large as imag-
inable: namely, 1 versus linear (!).7 This sharply contrasts with the case of partial Boolean functions, for
which Aaronson and Ambainis [AA15] showed that any N -bit problem solvable with k quantum queries
is also solvable with O
(
N1−1/2k
)
randomized queries, and hence a constant versus linear separation is
impossible. Thus, our result helps once again to underscore the advantage of sampling problems over
decision problems for quantum supremacy experiments. Given the extremely close connection between
Fourier Sampling and the IQP model [BJS10], our result also provides some evidence that classically sim-
ulating an n-qubit IQP circuit, to within constant error in variation distance, is about as hard as can be: it
might literally require Ω (2n) time.
Aaronson and Ambainis [AA15] didn’t directly address the natural relational version of Fourier Sampling,
which Aaronson [Aar10] had called Fourier Fishing in 2009. In Fourier Fishing, the goal is to output any
string z such that f̂ (z)2 ≥ 1, with nontrivial success probability. Unfortunately, the best lower bound on
the randomized query complexity of Fourier Fishing that follows from [Aar10] has the form 2n
Ω(1)
. As a
further contribution, in Section 6 we give a lower bound of Ω (2n/n) on the randomized query complexity
7We have learned (personal communication) that recently, and independently of us, Ashley Montanaro has obtained a commu-
nication complexity result that implies this result as a corollary.
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of Fourier Fishing, which both simplifies and subsumes the Ω (2n/n) lower bound for Fourier Sampling
by Aaronson and Ambainis [AA15] (which, of course, we also improve to Ω(2n) in this paper).
Quantum Supremacy Relative to Efficiently-Computable Oracles. In Section 7, we ask a new
question: when proving quantum supremacy theorems, can we “interpolate” between the black-box setting
of Sections 5 and 6, and the non-black-box setting of Sections 3 and 4? In particular, what happens if we
consider quantum sampling algorithms that can access an oracle, but we impose a constraint that the oracle
has to be “physically realistic”? One natural requirement here is that the oracle function f be computable in
the class P/poly:8 in other words, that there are polynomial-size circuits for f , which we imagine that our
sampling algorithms (both quantum and classical) can call as subroutines. If the sampling algorithms also
had access to explicit descriptions of the circuits, then we’d be back in the computational setting, where we
already know that there’s no hope at present of proving quantum supremacy unconditionally. But what if
our sampling algorithms know only that small circuits for f exist, without knowing what they are? Could
quantum supremacy be proven unconditionally then?
We give a satisfying answer to this question. First, by adapting constructions due to Zhandry [Zha12]
and (independently) Servedio and Gortler [SG04], we show that if one-way functions exist, then there are
oracles A ∈ P/poly such that BPPA 6= BQPA, and indeed even BQPA 6⊂ SZKA. (Here and later, the
one-way functions only need to be hard to invert classically, not quantumly.)
Note that, in the unrelativized world, there seems to be no hope at present of proving BPP 6= BQP
under any hypothesis nearly as weak as the existence of one-way functions. Instead one has to assume the
one-wayness of extremely specific functions, for example those based on factoring or discrete log.
Second, and more relevant to near-term experiments, we show that if there exist one-way functions
that take at least subexponential time to invert, then there are Boolean functions f ∈ P/poly such that
approximate Fourier Sampling on those f ’s requires classical exponential time. In other words: within
our “physically realistic oracle” model, there are feasible-looking quantum supremacy experiments, along
the lines of the IQP proposal [BJS10], such that a very standard and minimal cryptographic assumption is
enough to prove the hardness of simulating those experiments classically.
Third, we show that the above two results are essentially optimal, by proving a converse result: that even
in our P/poly oracle model, some computational assumption is still needed to prove quantum supremacy.
The precise statement is this: if SampBPP = SampBQP and NP ⊆ BPP, then SampBPPA = SampBQPA
for all A ∈ P/poly. Or equivalently: if we want to separate quantum from classical approximate sampling
relative to efficiently computable oracles, then we need to assume something about the unrelativized world:
either SampBPP 6= SampBQP (in which case we wouldn’t even need an oracle), or else NP 6⊂ BPP (which
is closely related to the assumption we do make, namely that one-way functions exist).
So to summarize, we’ve uncovered a “smooth tradeoff” between the model of computation and the
hypothesis needed for quantum supremacy. Relative to some oracle (and even a random oracle), we can
prove SampBPP 6= SampBQP unconditionally. Relative to some efficiently computable oracle, we can
prove SampBPP 6= SampBQP, but only under a weak computational assumption, like the existence of
one-way functions. Finally, with no oracle, we can currently prove SampBPP 6= SampBQP only under
special assumptions, such as factoring being hard, or the permanents of Gaussian matrices being hard to
approximate inBPPNP, or our QUATH assumption. Perhaps eventually, we’ll be able to prove SampBPP 6=
SampBQP under the sole assumption that PH is infinite, which would be a huge step forward—but at any
rate we’ll need some separation of classical complexity classes.9
One last remark: the idea of comparing complexity classes relative to P/poly oracles seems quite natural
even apart from its applications to quantum supremacy. So in Appendix A, we take an initial stab at
8More broadly, we could let f be computable in BQP/poly, but this doesn’t change the story too much.
9Unless, of course, someone were to separate P from PSPACE unconditionally!
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exploring the implications of that idea for other central questions in complexity theory. In particular,
we prove the surprising result there that PA = BPPA for all oracles A ∈ P/poly, if and only if the
derandomization hypothesis of Impagliazzo and Wigderson [IW97] holds (i.e., there exists a function in
E with 2Ω(n) circuit complexity). In our view, this helps to clarify Impagliazzo and Wigderson’s theorem
itself, by showing precisely in what way their circuit lower bound hypothesis is stronger than the desired
conclusion P = BPP. We also show that, if there are quantumly-secure one-way functions, then there
exists an oracle A ∈ P/poly such that SZKA 6⊂ BQPA.
1.4 Techniques
In our view, the central contributions of this work lie in the creation of new questions, models, and hardness
assumptions (such as QUATH and quantum supremacy relative to P/poly oracles), as well as in basic ob-
servations that somehow weren’t made before (such as the sum-products algorithm for simulating quantum
circuits)—all of it motivated by the goal of using complexity theory to inform ongoing efforts in experi-
mental physics to test the Extended Church-Turing Thesis. While some of our proofs are quite involved,
by and large the proof techniques are ones that will be familiar to complexity theorists. Even so, it seems
appropriate to say a few words about techniques here.
To prove, in Section 3, that “if QUATH is true, then HOG is hard,” we give a fairly straightforward
reduction: namely, we assume the existence of a polynomial-time classical algorithm to find high-probability
outputs of a given quantum circuit C. We then use that algorithm (together with a random self-reduction
trick) to guess the magnitude of a particular transition amplitude, such as 〈0n|C|0n〉, with probability slightly
better than chance, which is enough to refute QUATH.
One technical step is to show that, with Ω(1) probability, the distribution over n-bit strings sampled by
a random quantum circuit C is far from the uniform distribution. But not only can this be done, we show
that it can be done by examining only the very last gate of C, and ignoring all other gates! A challenge
that we leave open is to improve this, to show that the distribution sampled by C is far from uniform, not
merely with Ω(1) probability, but with 1 − 1/ exp(n) probability. In Appendix E, we present numerical
evidence for this conjecture, and indeed for a stronger conjecture, that the probabilities appearing in the
output distribution of a random quantum circuit behave like independent, exponentially-distributed random
variables. (We note that Brandao, Harrow and Horodecki [BHH16] recently proved a closely-related result,
which unfortunately is not quite strong enough for our purposes.)
In Section 4, to give our polynomial-space, dO(n)-time classical algorithm for simulating an n-qubit,
depth-d quantum circuit C, we use a simple recursive strategy, reminiscent of Savitch’s Theorem. Namely,
we slice the circuit into two layers, C1 and C2, of depth d/2 each, and then express a transition amplitude
〈x|C|z〉 of interest to us as
〈x|C|z〉 =
∑
y∈{0,1}n
〈x|C1|y〉 〈y|C2|z〉 .
We then compute each 〈x|C1|y〉 and 〈y|C2|z〉 by recursively slicing C1 and C2 into layers of depth d/4
each, and so on. What takes more work is to obtain a further improvement if C has only nearest-neighbor
interactions on a grid graph—for that, we use a more sophisticated divide-and-conquer approach—and also
to interpolate our recursive algorithm with the 2n-space Schro¨dinger simulation, in order to make the best
possible use of whatever memory is available.
Our construction, in Section 5, of an oracle relative to which SampBPP = SampBQP and yet PH is
infinite involves significant technical difficulty. As a first step, we can use a PSPACE oracle to collapse
SampBPP with SampBQP, and then use one of many known oracles (or, by the recent breakthrough of
Rossman, Servedio, and Tan [RST15], even a random oracle) to make PH infinite. The problem is that,
if we do this in any naı¨ve way, then the oracle that makes PH infinite will also re-separate SampBPP and
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SampBQP, for example because of the approximate Fourier Sampling problem. Thus, we need to hide
the oracle that makes PH infinite, in such a way that a PH algorithm can still find the oracle (and hence, PH
is still infinite), but a SampBQP algorithm can’t find it with any non-negligible probability—crucially, not
even if the SampBQP algorithm’s input x provides a clue about the oracle’s location. Once one realizes that
these are the challenges, one then has about seven pages of work to ensure that SampBPP and SampBQP
remain equal, relative to the oracle that one has constructed. Incidentally, we know that this equivalence
can’t possibly hold for exact sampling, so something must force small errors to arise when the SampBPP
algorithm simulates the SampBQP one. That something is basically the tiny probability that the quantum
algorithm will succeed at finding the hidden oracle, which however can be upper-bounded using quantum-
mechanical linearity.
In Section 6, to prove a Ω (2n) lower bound on the classical query complexity of approximate Fourier
Sampling, we use the same basic strategy that Aaronson and Ambainis [AA15] used to prove a Ω (2n/n)
lower bound, but with a much more careful analysis. Specifically, we observe that any Fourier Sampling
algorithm would also yield an algorithm whose probability of accepting, while always small, is extremely
sensitive to some specific Fourier coefficient, say f̂ (0 · · · 0). We then lower-bound the randomized query
complexity of accepting with the required sensitivity to f̂ (0 · · · 0), taking advantage of the fact that f̂ (0 · · · 0)
is simply proportional to
∑
x
f (x), so that all x’s can be treated symmetrically. Interestingly, we also give
a different, much simpler argument that yields a Ω (2n/n) lower bound on the randomized query complex-
ity of Fourier Fishing, which then immediately implies a Ω (2n/n) lower bound for Fourier Sampling as
well. However, if we want to improve the bound to Ω (2n), then the original argument that Aaronson and
Ambainis [AA15] used to prove Ω (2n/n) seems to be needed.
In Section 7, to prove that one-way functions imply the existence of an oracle A ∈ P/poly such that
PA 6= BQPA, we adapt a construction that was independently proposed by Zhandry [Zha12] and by Servedio
and Gortler [SG04]. In this construction, we first use known reductions [HILL99, GGM86] to convert
a one-way function into a classically-secure pseudorandom permutation, say σ. We then define a new
function by gr(x) := σ(xmod r), where x is interpreted as an integer written in binary, and r is a hidden
period. Finally, we argue that either Shor’s algorithm [Sho97] leads to a quantum advantage over classical
algorithms in finding the period of gr, or else gr was not pseudorandom, contrary to assumption. To show
that subexponentially-secure one-way functions imply the existence of an oracle A ∈ P/poly relative to
which Fourier Sampling is classically hard, we use similar reasoning. The main difference is that now,
to construct a distinguisher against a pseudorandom function f , we need classical exponential time just to
verify the outputs of a claimed polynomial-time classical algorithm for Fourier Sampling f—and that’s
why we need to assume 2n
Ω(1)
security.
Finally, to prove that SampBPP = SampBQP and NP ⊆ BPP imply SampBPPA = SampBQPA for
all A ∈ P/poly, we design a step-by-step classical simulation of a quantum algorithm, call it Q, that queries
an oracle A ∈ P/poly. We use the assumption SampBPP = SampBQP to sample from the probability
distribution over queries to A that Q makes at any given time step. Then we use the assumption NP ⊆ BPP
to guess a function f ∈ P/poly that’s consistent with nO(1) sampled classical queries to A. Because of the
limited number of functions in P/poly, standard sample complexity bounds for PAC-learning imply that any
such f that we guess will probably agree with the “true” oracle A on most inputs. Quantum-mechanical
linearity then implies that the rare disagreements between f and A will have at most a small effect on the
future behavior of Q.
2 Preliminaries
For a positive integer n, we use [n] to denote the integers from 1 to n. Logarithms are base 2.
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2.1 Quantum Circuits
We now introduce some notations for quantum circuits, which will be used throughout this paper.
In a quantum circuit, without loss of generality, we assume all gates are unitary and acting on exactly
two qubits each10.
Given a quantum circuit C, slightly abusing notation, we also use C to denote the unitary operator
induced by C. Suppose there are n qubits and m gates in C; then we index the qubits from 1 to n. We also
index gates from 1 to m in chronological order for convenience.
For each subset S ⊆ [n] of the qubits, let HS be the Hilbert space corresponding to the qubits in S,
and IS be the identity operator on HS . Then the unitary operator Ui for the i-th gate can be written as
Ui := Oi⊗I[n]\{ai,bi}, in whichOi is a unitary operator onH{ai,bi} (the Hilbert space spanned by the qubits
ai and bi), and I[n]\{ai,bi} is the identity operator on the other qubits.
We say that a quantum circuit has depth d, if its gates can be partitioned into d layers (in chronological
order), such that the gates in each layer act on disjoint pairs of qubits. Suppose the i-th layer consists of the
gates in [Li, Ri]. We define C[r←l] = URr · URr−1 . . . ULl+1 · ULl , that is, the sub-circuit between the l-th
layer and the r-th layer.
Base Graphs and Grids
In Sections 3 and 4, we will sometimes assume locality of a given quantum circuit. To formalize this notion,
we define the base graph of a quantum circuit.
Definition 2.1. Given a quantum circuit C on n qubits, its base graph GC = (V,E) is an undirected graph
defined by V = [n], and
E = {(a, b) | there is a quantum gate that acts on qubits a and b.}.
We will consider a specific kind of base graph, the grids.
Definition 2.2. The grid G of size H ×W is a graph with vertices V = {(x, y) | x ∈ [H], y ∈ [W ]} and
edges E = {(a, b) | |a− b|1 = 1, a ∈ V, b ∈ V }, and we say that grid G has H rows and W columns.
2.2 Complexity Classes for Sampling Problems
Definitions for SampBPP and SampBQP
We adopt the following definition for sampling problems from [Aar14].
Definition 2.3 (Sampling Problems, SampBPP, and SampBQP). A sampling problem S is a collection
of probability distributions (Dx)x∈{0,1}∗ , one for each input string x ∈ {0, 1}n, where Dx is a distribution
over {0, 1}p(n), for some fixed polynomial p. Then SampBPP is the class of sampling problems S =
(Dx)x∈{0,1}∗ for which there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm B that, given
〈
x, 01/ε
〉
as
input, samples from a probability distribution Cx such that ‖Cx −Dx‖ ≤ ε. SampBQP is defined the same
way, except that B is a quantum algorithm rather than a classical one.
Oracle versions of these classes can also be defined in the natural way.
10Except for oracle gates, which may act on any number of qubits.
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A Canonical Form of SampBQP Oracle Algorithms
To ease our discussion about SampBQPO, we describe a canonical form of SampBQP oracle algorithms.
Any other reasonable definitions of SampBQP oracle algorithms (like with quantum oracle Turing ma-
chines) can be transformed into this form easily.
Without loss of generality, we can assume a SampBQP oracle algorithm M with oracle access to
O1,O2, . . . ,Ok (k is a universal constant) acts in three stages, as follows.
1. Given an input 〈x, 01/ε〉, M first uses a classical routine (which does not use the oracles) to output a
quantum circuit C with p(n, 1/ε) qubits and p(n, 1/ε) gates in polynomial time, where p is a fixed
polynomial. Note that C can use the O1,O2, . . . ,Ok gates in addition to a universal set of quantum
gates.
2. Then M runs the outputted quantum circuit with the initial state |0〉⊗p(n,1/ε), and measures all the
qubits to get an outcome z in {0, 1}p(n,1/ε).
3. Finally, M uses another classical routine Aoutput (which does not use the oracles) on the input z, to
output its final sample Aoutput(z) ∈ {0, 1}∗.
Clearly, M solves different sampling problems (or does not solve any sampling problem at all) given
different oraclesO1,O2, . . . ,Ok. Therefore, we useMO1,O2,...,Ok to indicate the particular algorithm when
the oracles are O1,O2, . . . ,Ok.
2.3 Distinguishing Two Pure Quantum States
We also need a standard result for distinguishing two pure quantum states.
Theorem 2.4 (Helstrom’s decoder for two pure states). The maximum success probability for distinguishing
two pure quantum states |ϕ0〉 and |ϕ1〉 given with prior probabilities pi0 and pi1, is given by
psucc =
1 +
√
1− 4pi0pi1F
2
,
where F := |〈ϕ0|ϕ1〉|2 is the fidelity between the two states.
We’ll also need that for two similar quantum states, the distributions induced by measuring them are
close.
Corollary 2.5. Let |ϕ0〉 and |ϕ1〉 be two pure quantum state such that ||ϕ0〉 − |ϕ1〉| ≤ ε. For a quantum
state ϕ, define D(ϕ) be the distribution on {0, 1}∗ induced by some quantum sampling procedure, we have
‖D(ϕ0)−D(ϕ1)‖ ≤
√
2ε.
Proof. Fix prior probabilities pi0 = pi1 =
1
2
.
Note that we have a distinguisher of |ϕ0〉 and |ϕ1〉 with success probability 1 + ‖D(ϕ0)−D(ϕ1)‖
2
by
invoking that quantum sampling procedure.
By the assumption, |〈ϕ0||ϕ1〉| = |〈ϕ0|·(|ϕ0〉+(|ϕ1〉−|ϕ0〉)| ≥ 1−ε, hence F = |〈ϕ0|ϕ1〉|2 ≥ (1−ε)2.
So we have
1 + ‖D(ϕ0)−D(ϕ1)‖
2
≤ 1 +
√
1− (1− ε)2
2
This implies ‖D(ϕ0)−D(ϕ1)‖1 ≤
√
1− (1− ε)2 =
√
2ε− ε2 ≤
√
2ε.
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2.4 A Multiplicative Chernoff Bound
Lemma 2.6. Suppose X1, X2, . . . , Xn are independent random variables taking values in [0, 1]. Let X
denote their sum and let µ = E[X]. Then for any δ > 1, we have
Pr[X ≥ (1 + δ)µ] ≤ e− δµ3 .
Corollary 2.7. For any 0 < τ , suppose X1, X2, . . . , Xn are independent random variables taking values
in [0, τ ]. Let X denote their sum and let µ = E[X]. Then for any δ > 1, we have
Pr[X ≥ (1 + δ)µ] ≤ e− δµ3τ .
Proof. Replace each Xi by Xi/τ and apply the previous lemma.
3 The Hardness of Quantum Circuit Sampling
We now discuss our random quantum circuit proposal for demonstrating quantum supremacy.
3.1 Preliminaries
We first introduce some notations. We use U(N) to denote the group of N ×N unitary matrices, µNHaar for
the Haar measure on U(N), and µNrand for the Haar measure on N -dimensional pure states.
For a pure state |u〉 on n qubits, we define probList(|u〉) to be the list consisting of 2n numbers, |〈u|x〉|2
for each x ∈ {0, 1}n.
Given N real numbers a1, a2, . . . , aN , we use uphalf(a1, a2, . . . , aN ) to denote the sum of the largest
N/2 numbers among them, and we let
adv(|u〉) = uphalf(probList(|u〉)).
Finally, we say that an output z ∈ {0, 1}n is heavy for a quantum circuit C, if it is greater than the median
of probList(C|0n〉).
3.2 Random quantum circuit on grids
Recall that we assume a quantum circuit consists of only 2-qubit gates. Our random quantum circuit on
grids of n qubits and m gates (assuming m ≥ n) is generated as follows (though the basic structure of
our hardness argument will not be very sensitive to details, and would also work for many other circuit
ensembles):
• All the qubits are arranged as a √n × √n grid (see Definition 2.2), and a gate can only act on two
adjacent qubits.
• For each t ∈ [m] with t ≤ n, we pick the t-th qubit and a random neighbor of it.11
• For each t ∈ [m] with t > n, we pick a uniform random pair of adjacent qubits in the grid√n×√n.
• Then, in either case, we set the t-th gate to be a unitary drawn from µ4Haar acting on these two qubits.
Slightly abusing notation, we use µn,mgrid to denote both the above distribution on quantum circuits and
the distribution on U(2n) induced by it.
11The purpose here is to make sure that there is a gate on every qubit.
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Conditional distribution νgrid
For convenience, for a quantum circuitC, we abbreviate adv(C|0n〉) as adv(C). Consider a simple quantum
algorithm which measures C|0n〉 in the computational basis to get an output z. Then by definition, adv(C)
is simply the probability that z is heavy for C.
We want that, when a quantum circuit C is drawn, adv(C) is large (that is, bounded above 1/2), and
therefore the simple quantum algorithm has a substantial advantage on generating a heavy output, compared
with the trivial algorithm of guessing a random string.
For convenience, we also consider the following conditional distribution νn,mgrid : it keeps drawing a circuit
C ← µn,mgrid until the sample circuit C satisfies adv(C) ≥ 0.7.
Lower bound on adv(C)
We need to show that a circuit C drawn from νn,mgrid has a large probability of having adv(C) ≥ 0.7. In
order to show that, we give a cute and simple lemma, which states that the expectation of adv(C) is large.
Surprisingly, its proof only makes use of the randomness introduced by the very last gate!
Lemma 3.1. For n ≥ 2 and m ≥ n
E
C←µn,mgrid
[adv(C)] ≥ 5
8
.
In fact, we conjecture that adv(C) is large with an overwhelming probability.
Conjecture 1. For n ≥ 2 and m ≥ n2, and for all constants ε > 0,
Pr
C←µn,mgrid
[
adv(C) <
1 + ln 2
2
− ε
]
< exp {−Ω(n)} .
We give some numerical simulation evidence for Conjecture 1 in Appendix E.
Remark 3.2. Assuming Conjecture 1, in practice, one can sample from νgrid by simply sampling from µgrid,
the uniform distribution over circuits—doing so only introduces an error probability of exp{−Ω(n)}.
3.3 The HOG Problem
Now we formally define the task in our quantum algorithm proposal.
Problem 1 (HOG, or Heavy Output Generation). Given a random quantum circuitC from νn,mgrid form ≥ n2,
generate k binary strings z1, z2, . . . , zk in {0, 1}n such that at least a 2/3 fraction of zi’s are heavy for C.
The following proposition states that there is a simple quantum algorithm which solves the above prob-
lem with overwhelming probability.
Proposition 3.3. There is a quantum algorithm that succeeds at HOG with probability 1− exp{−Ω(k)}.
Proof. The algorithm just simulates the circuit C with initial state |0n〉, then measures in the computational
basis k times independently to output k binary strings.
From the definition of νgrid, we have adv(C) ≥ 0.7 > 2/3. So by a Chernoff bound, with probability
1− exp{Ω(k)}, at least a 2/3 fraction of zi’s are heavy for C, in which case the algorithm solves HOG.
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3.4 Classical Hardness Assuming QUATH
We now state our classical hardness assumption.
Assumption 1 (QUATH, or the Quantum Threshold assumption). There is no polynomial-time classical
algorithm that takes as input a random quantum circuit C ← νn,mgrid for m ≥ n2 and decides whether 0n is
heavy for C with success probability 1/2 + Ω(2−n).
Remark 3.4. Note that 1/2 is the success probability obtained by always outputting either 0 or 1. Therefore,
the above assumption means that no efficient algorithm can beat the trivial algorithm even by Ω(2−n).
Next, we show that QUATH implies that no efficient classical algorithm can solve HOG.
Theorem 3.5. Assuming QUATH, no polynomial-time classical algorithm can solve HOG with probability
at least 0.99.
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that there is such a classical polynomial-time algorithm A. Using A, we
will construct an algorithm to violate QUATH.
The algorithm is quite simple. Given a quantum circuit C ← νn,mgrid , we first draw a uniform random
string z ∈ {0, 1}n. Then for each i such that zi = 1, we apply a NOT gate on the i-th qubit. Note that this
gate can be “absorbed” into the last gate acting on the i-th qubit in C. Hence, we still get a circuit C ′ with
m gates. Moreover, it is easy to see that C ′ is distributed exactly the same as C even if conditioning on a
particular z, and we have 〈0n|C|0n〉 = 〈0n|C ′|z〉, which means that 0n is heavy for C if and only if z is
heavy for C ′.
Next our algorithm runs A on circuit C ′ to get k outputs z1, . . . , zk, and picks an output zi? among these
k outputs uniformly at random. If zi? = z, then the algorithm outputs 1; otherwise it outputs a uniform
random bit.
SinceA solves HOG with probability 0.99, we have that each zk is heavy for C ′ with probability at least
0.99 · 2/3.
Now, since z is a uniform random string, the probability that our algorithm decides correctly whether z
is heavy for C ′ is
Pr[z = zi? ] · 0.99 · 2
3
+ Pr[z 6= zi? ] · 1/2 = 2−n · 0.99 · 2
3
+ (1− 2−n) · 1/2
=
1
2
+ Ω(2−n).
But this contradicts QUATH, so we are done.
3.5 Proof for Lemma 3.1
We first need a simple lemma which helps us to lower bound adv(|u〉).
For a pure quantum state |u〉, define
dev(|u〉) =
∑
w∈{0,1}n
∣∣∣|〈u|w〉|2 − 2−n∣∣∣.
In other words, dev(|u〉) measures the non-uniformity of the distribution obtained by measuring |u〉 in the
computational basis.
The next lemma shows that, when dev(|u〉) is large, so is adv(|u〉). Therefore, in order to establish
Lemma 3.1, it suffices to lower-bound dev(|u〉).
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Lemma 3.6. For a pure quantum state |u〉, we have
adv(|u〉) ≥ 1
2
+
dev(u)
4
.
We will also need the following technical lemma.
Lemma 3.7. Let |u〉 ← µ2rand. Then
E
|u〉←µ2rand
[∣∣∣|〈u|0〉|2 − |〈u|1〉|2∣∣∣] = 0.5.
The proofs of Lemma 3.6 and Lemma 3.7 are based on simple but tedious calculations, so we defer them
to Appendix B.
Now we are ready to prove Lemma 3.1.
Proof of Lemma 3.1. Surprisingly, our proof only uses the randomness introduced by the very last gate.
That is, the claim holds even if there is an adversary who fixes all the gates except for the last one.
We use In to denote the n-qubit identity operator.
Let C ← µn,mgrid . From Lemma 3.6, it suffices to show that
E
C←µn,mgrid
[dev(C|0n〉)] ≥ 1
2
.
Suppose the last gate U ← µ4Haar acts on qubits a and b. Let the unitary corresponding to the circuit
before applying the last gate be V , and |v〉 = V |0n〉. Now, suppose we apply another unitary Ua drawn
from µ2Haar on the qubit a. It is not hard to see that U and (Ua ⊗ I1) · U are identically distributed. So it
suffices to show that
E
U←µ4Haar,Ua←µ2Haar
[
adv
(
(Ua ⊗ In−1)(U ⊗ In−2)|v〉
)]
≥ 0.6.
We are going to show that the above holds even for a fixed U . That is, fix a U ∈ U(4) and let
|u〉 = U ⊗ In−2)|v〉. Then we will prove that
E
Ua←µ2Haar
[
dev
(
(Ua ⊗ In−1)|v〉
)]
≥ 1
2
.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that a is the last qubit. Then we write
|u〉 =
∑
w∈{0,1}n
aw|w〉,
and
|z〉 = (Ua ⊗ In−1)|u〉.
Now we partition the 2n basis states into 2n−1 buckets, one for each string in {0, 1}n−1. That is, for
each p ∈ {0, 1}n−1, there is a bucket that consists of basis states {|p0〉, |p1〉}. Note that since Ua acts on
the last qubit, only amplitudes of basis states in the same bucket can affect each other.
For a given p ∈ {0, 1}n−1, if both ap0 and ap1 are zero, we simply ignore this bucket. Otherwise, we
can define a quantum state
|tp〉 = ap0|0〉+ ap1|1〉√|ap0|2 + |ap1|2 ,
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and
|zp〉 = Ua|tp〉.
Clearly, we have 〈z|p0〉 =
√
|ap0|2 + |ap1|2 · 〈zp|0〉 and 〈z|p1〉 =
√
|ap0|2 + |ap1|2 · 〈zp|1〉. Plugging
in, we have
E
Ua←µ2Haar
[∣∣∣|〈z|p0〉|2 − 2−n∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣|〈z|p1〉|2 − 2−n∣∣∣]
≥ E
Ua←µ2Haar
[∣∣∣|〈z|p0〉|2 − |〈z|p1〉|2∣∣∣] (triangle inequality)
=
(|ap0|2 + |ap1|2) · E
Ua←µ2Haar
[∣∣∣|〈zp|0〉|2 − |〈zp|1〉|2∣∣∣] .
Now, since |tp〉 is a pure state, and Ua is drawn from µ2Haar, we see that |zp〉 is distributed as a Haar-
random pure state. So from Lemma 3.7, we have
E
Ua←µ2Haar
[∣∣∣|〈zp|0〉|2 − |〈zp|1〉|2∣∣∣] = 0.5.
Therefore,
E
Ua←µ2Haar
[∣∣∣|〈z|p0〉|2 − 2−n∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣|〈z|p1〉|2 − 2−n∣∣∣] ≥ 1
2
· (|ap0|2 + |ap1|2) .
Summing up for each p ∈ {0, 1}n−1, we have
E
Ua←µ2Haar
[dev(|z〉)] ≥ 1
2
,
which completes the proof.
4 New Algorithms to Simulate Quantum Circuits
In this section, we present two algorithms for simulating a quantum circuit with n qubits and m gates: one
algorithm for arbitrary circuits, and another for circuits that act locally on grids. What’s new about these
algorithms is that they use both polynomial space and close to exp(n) time (but despite that, they don’t
violate the QUATH assumption from Section 3, for the reason pointed out in Section 1.3). Previously, it
was known how to simulate a quantum circuit in polynomial space and exp(m) time (as in the proof of
BQP ⊆ P#P), or in exponential space and exp(n) time.
In addition, we provide a time-space trade-off scheme, which enables even faster simulation at the cost
of more space usage. See Section 2.1 for the quantum circuit notations that are used throughout this section.
4.1 Polynomial-Space Simulation Algorithms for General Quantum Circuits
We first present a simple recursive algorithm for general circuits.
Theorem 4.1. Given a quantum circuit C on n qubits with depth d, and two computational basis states
|x〉, |y〉, we can compute 〈y|C|x〉 in O(n · (2d)n+1) time and O(n log d) space.
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Proof. In the base case d = 1, the answer can be trivially computed in O(n) time.
When d > 1, we have
〈y|C|x〉 = 〈y|C[d←d/2+1] · C[d/2←1]|x〉
= 〈y|C[d←d/2+1]
 ∑
z∈{0,1}n
|z〉〈z|
C[d/2←1]|x〉
=
∑
z∈{0,1}n
〈y|C[d←d/2+1]|z〉 · 〈z|C[d/2←1]|x〉. (2)
Then, for each z, we calculate 〈y|C[d←d/2+1]|z〉 · 〈z|C[d/2←1]|x〉 by recursively calling the algorithm on
the two sub-circuits C[d←d/2+1] and C[d/2←1] respectively; and sum them up to calculate (2).
It is easy to see the above algorithm is correct, and its running time can be analyzed as follows: let F (d)
be its running time on a circuit of d layers; then we have F (1) = O(n), and by the above discussion
F (d) ≤ 2n+1 · F (dd/2e) = O(n · 2(n+1)dlog de) = O(n · (2dlog de)n+1) ≤ O(n · (2d)n+1),
which proves our running time bound.
Finally, we can see in each recursion level, we need O(n) space to save the indices of |x〉 and |y〉, and
O(1) space to store an intermediate answer. Since there are at most O(log d) recursion levels, the total
space is bounded by O(n log d).
4.2 Faster Polynomial Space Simulation Algorithms for Grid Quantum Circuits
When a quantum circuit is spatially local, i.e., its base graph can be embedded on a grid, we can further
speed up the simulation with a more sophisticated algorithm.
We first introduce a simple lemma which shows that we can find a small balanced cut in a two-dimensional
grid.
Lemma 4.2. Given a grid G = (V,E) of size H ×W such that |V | ≥ 2, we can find a subset S ⊂ E such
that
• |S| ≤ O(
√
|V |), and
• after S is removed, G becomes a union of two disconnected grids with size smaller than 2
3
|V |.
Proof. We can assume H ≥ W without loss of generality and simply set S to be the set of all the edges
between the bH/2c-th row and the bH/2c+ 1-th row; then both claims are easy to verify.
We now present a faster algorithm for simulating quantum circuits on grids.
Theorem 4.3. Given a quantum circuit C on n qubits with depth d, and two computational basis states
|x〉, |y〉, assuming that GC can be embedded into a two-dimensional grid with size n (with the embedding
explicitly specified), we can compute 〈y|C|x〉 in 2O(d
√
n) time and O(d · n log n) space.
Proof. For ease of presentation, we slightly generalize the definition of quantum circuits: now each gate can
be of the form Oi ⊗ I[n]\{ai,bi} (a 2-qubit gate) or Oi ⊗ I[n]\{ai} (a 1-qubit gate) or simply I[n] (a 0-qubit
gate, which is introduced just for convenience).
The algorithm works by trying to break the current large instance into many small instances which
we then solve recursively. But unlike the algorithm in Theorem 4.1, which reduces an instance to many
19
sub-instances with fewer gates, our algorithm here reduces an instance to many sub-instances with fewer
qubits.
The base case, n = 1 qubit. In this case, all the gates are either 1-qubit or 0-qubit; hence the answer
can be calculated straightforwardly in O(m) time and constant space.
Cutting the grid by a small set. When n ≥ 2, by Lemma 4.2, we can find a subset S of edges with
|S| ≤ O(√n). After S is removed, the grid becomes a union of two disconnected grids A and B (we use
A,B to denote both the grids and the sets of the vertices in the grid for simplicity) with size smaller than
2
3
n.
Let
{R = i | Ui is of the form Oi ⊗ I[n]\{ai,bi} and (ai, bi) ∈ S},
that is, the set of the indices of the gates crossing the cut S. Without loss of generality, we can assume that
for each i ∈ R, we have ai ∈ A and bi ∈ B.
Since in a single layer, there is at most one gate acting on a particular adjacent pair of qubits, we have
|R| ≤ O(d√n).
Breaking the gates in R. Now, for each i ∈ R, we decompose Oi (which can be viewed as a matrix in
C4×4) into a sum of 16 single-entry matrices Oi,1, Oi,2, . . . , Oi,16.
Write Oi as
Oi =
∑
x,y∈{0,1}2
〈y|Oi|x〉 · |y〉〈x|.
Then we set Oi,j = 〈yj |Oi|xj〉 · |yj〉〈xj | for each j ∈ [16], where (xj , yj) is the j-th ordered pair in
{0, 1}2 × {0, 1}2.
Decomposing the instance. Now, we are going to expand each Ui = Oi ⊗ I[n]\{ai,bi} as a sum
Ui =
16∑
j=1
Oi,j ⊗ I[n]\{ai,bi}
for each i ∈ R, and therefore decompose the answer 〈y|C|x〉 = 〈y|UmUm−1 · · ·U1|x〉 into a sum of 16|R|
terms. More concretely, for a mapping τ from R to [16] and an index i ∈ [m], we define
Ui,τ =
{
Oi,τ(i) × I[n]\{ai,bi} i ∈ R.
Ui i 6∈ R.
Let T be the set of all mappings from R to [16]. Then we have
〈y|C|x〉 = 〈y|UmUm−1 · · ·U1|x〉 =
∑
τ∈T
〈y|Um,τUm−1,τ · · ·U1,τ |x〉.
Dealing with the sub-instance. For each τ ∈ T and an index i ∈ [m], we are going to show that Ui,τ
can be decomposed as UAi,τ ⊗ UBi,τ , where UAi,τ and UBi,τ are operators onHA andHB respectively.
When i ∈ R, by definition, there exist x, y ∈ {0, 1}2 and α ∈ C such that
Ui,τ = α · |y〉〈x| ⊗ I[n]\{ai,bi} = α ·
(|y0〉〈x0| ⊗ IA\{ai})⊗ (|y1〉〈x1| ⊗ IB\{bi}) .
Otherwise i /∈ R. In this case, if Oi is of the form Oi ⊗ I[n]\{ai,bi}, then ai, bi must be both in A or in
B and the claim trivially holds; and the claim is also obvious when Oi is of the form Oi ⊗ I[n]\{ai} or I[n].
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Moreover, one can easily verify that each UAi,τ is of the form O
A
i ⊗ IA\{ai,bi} or OAi ⊗ IA\{ai} or simply
IA, in which OAi is (respectively) a 2-qubit operator on H{ai,bi} or a 1-qubit operator on H{ai}), and the
same holds for each UBi,τ .
Hence, we have
〈y|UmUm−1 · · ·U1|x〉
=
∑
τ∈T
〈y|Um,τUm−1,τ · · ·U1,τ |x〉.
=
∑
τ∈T
〈y|(UAm,τ ⊗ UBm,τ )(UAm−1,τ ⊗ UBm−1,τ ) · · · (UA1,τ ⊗ UB1,τ )|x〉.
=
∑
τ∈T
〈yA|UAm,τUAm−1,τ · · ·UA1,τ |xA〉 · 〈yB|UBm,τUBm−1,τ · · ·UB1,τ |xB〉, (3)
where xA, xB (yA, yB) is the projection of x (y) onHA andHB .
So from the above discussion, we can then calculate 〈yA|UAm,τUAm−1,τ · · ·UA1,τ |xA〉 with a recursive call
with computational basis states |xA〉 and |yA〉, grid A, and m gates UA1,τ , UA2,τ , . . . , UAm,τ .
The matrix element 〈yB|UBm,τUBm−1,τ · · ·UB1,τ |xB〉 can be computed similarly. After that we sum up all
the terms in (3) to get the answer.
Complexity analysis. Now we are going to bound the running time. Let F (n) be an upper bound on
the running time when the size of the remaining grid is n. Then we have
F (n) =
O(m) when n = 1.2O(d√n) · max
k∈[n/3,2n/3]
F (k) otherwise.
The second case is due to the fact that the sizes of sub-instances (i.e., the sizes ofA andB) lie in [n/3, 2n/3],
and T = 16|R| = 2O(d
√
n). It is not hard to see that F (n) is an increasing function, so we have F (n) =
2O(d
√
n)F (2n/3) for n > 1, which further simplifies to F (n) = 2O(d
√
n).
Finally, we can see that at each recursion level, we need O(d · n) space to store the circuit, and O(1)
space to store the intermediate answer. Since there are at most log n recursion levels, the space complexity
is O(d · n log n).
Interestingly, by using tensor network methods, Markov and Shi [MS08] gave an algorithm for simu-
lating quantum circuits on grids with similar running time to ours. However, the difference is that Markov
and Shi’s algorithm requires 2O(d
√
n) time and 2O(d
√
n) space, whereas ours requires 2O(d
√
n) time and only
polynomial space.
The algorithm of Theorem 4.3 achieves a speedup over Theorem 4.1 only for small d, but we can
combine it with the algorithm in Theorem 4.1 to get a faster algorithm for the whole range of d.
Theorem 4.4. There is a constant c such that, given a quantum circuit C on n qubits with depth d, and two
computational basis states |x〉, |y〉, assuming that GC can be embedded into a two dimensional grid with
size n (with the embedding explicitly specified), we can compute 〈y|C|x〉 in
O(2n ·
[
1 +
(
d
c
√
n
)n+1]
)
time and O(d · n log n) space.
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Proof. By Theorem 4.3, there is a constant c such that we have an O(2n) time and polynomial space algo-
rithm for calculating 〈y|C|x〉 when the depth is at most c√n for circuit on grids. So we can use the same
algorithm as in Theorem 4.1, except that we revert to the algorithm in Theorem 4.3 when the depth is no
more than c
√
n.
We still let F (d) be the running time on a circuit of d layers. We then have F (d) = O(2n) when
d ≤ c√n. From the above discussion, we can see that for d > c√n,
F (d) ≤ 2n+1 · F (dd
2
e) = O(2n · 2(n+1)dlog(d/c
√
n)e) = O(2n ·
(
d
c
√
n
)n+1
),
which proves the running time bound. And it is not hard to see that the algorithm’s space usage is dominated
by O(d · n log n).
4.3 Space-Time Trade-off Schemes
We now show how to optimize the running time for whatever space is available.
Theorem 4.5. Given a quantum circuit C on n qubits with depth d, two computational basis states |x〉, |y〉
and an integer k, we can compute 〈y|C|x〉 in
O(n2n−k · 2(k+1)dlog de) ≤ O(n2n−k · (2d)k+1)
time and O(2n−k log d) space.
Proof. Decomposing the whole Hilbert space H[n]. We first decompose H[n] into a direct sum of many
subspaces. Let wi be the i-th string in {0, 1}k in lexicographic order. For each i ∈ [2k], let Hi =
Span(|wi0n−k〉, ...|wi1n−k〉). Then we have
H[n] =
2k⊕
i=1
Hi.
.
Also, let Pi be the projection fromH[n] toHi; then
I[n] =
2k∑
i=1
Pi.
Now we generalize the original problem as follows: given two indices s, t ∈ [2k] and a pure state |u〉 in
Hs, we want to compute PtC|u〉. By choosing s and t such that Hs contains |x〉 and Ht contains |y〉, we
can easily solve the original problem.
The base case d = 1. When there is only one layer, PtC|u〉 can be calculated straightforwardly in
O(n · 2n−k) time and O(2n−k) space.
Recursion. When d > 1, we have
PtC|u〉 = PtC[d←d/2+1] · C[d/2←1]|u〉
= PtC[d←d/2+1]
 ∑
z∈[2k]
Pz
C[d/2←1]|u〉
=
∑
z∈[2k]
PtC[d←d/2+1]PzC[d/2←1]|u〉.
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We can then calculate PtC[d←d/2+1]PzC[d/2←1]|u〉 for each z as follows: we first use a recursive call to get
|b〉 = PzC[d/2←1]|u〉 and a second recursive call to compute PtC[d←d/2+1]|b〉 (note that |b〉 ∈ Hz).
Complexity analysis. It is easy to see that the total space usage is O(2n−k log d), since for each i,
storing a vector inHi takes O(2n−k) space, and we only need to record O(1) such vectors at each recursion
level. In addition, when d = 1, we need only O(2n−k) space.
For the running time bound, let F (d) denote the running time on a circuit of d layers; then F (1) =
O(n2n−k). From the above discussion, it follows that
F (d) ≤ 2k+1 · F (dd/2e) = O(n2n−k · 2(k+1)dlog(d)e) = O(n2n−k · (2d)k+1).
The above trade-off scheme can be further improved for quantum circuits on grids.
Theorem 4.6. There is a constant c such that, given a quantum circuit C on n qubits with depth d, two com-
putational basis states |x〉, |y〉 and an integer k, assuming that GC can be embedded into a two dimensional
grid with size n, we can compute 〈y|C|x〉 in
2O(n) ·
[
1 + (2d/c
√
n)k+1
]
time and
O
(
2n−k max(1, log(d/
√
n))
)
space.
Proof. By Theorem 4.3, there is a constant c such that we have an O(2n) time algorithm for calculating
〈y|C|x〉 for circuits on grids with depth at most c√n.
Then we use the same algorithm as in Theorem 4.5, with the only modification that when d ≤ c√n, we
calculate Pt · C|u〉 by 22(n−k) calls of the algorithm in Theorem 4.3.
With the same analysis as in Theorem 4.5, when d > c
√
n, we can see that the total space usage is
O(2n−k log(d/c
√
n)) , and the running time is
O(2n+2(n−k)+(k+1)dlog(d/c
√
n)e) = O(2O(n) · (2d/c√n))k+1).
Combining with the algorithm for d ≤ c√n proves our running time and space bound.
5 Strong Quantum Supremacy Theorems Must Be Non-Relativizing
In this section we show that there is an oracle relative to which SampBPP = SampBQP, yet PHO is
infinite.
Recall that an oracle O is a function O : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}, and the combination of two oracles O0,O1,
denoted asO0⊕O1, simply maps z ∈ {0, 1}∗ toOz1(z2, z3, . . . , z|z|) (cf. [FFKL03]). We useOn to denote
the restriction of O on {0, 1}n.
5.1 Intuition
We have two simultaneous objectives: (1) we need SampBPP and SampBQP to be equal; and (2) we also
need PH to be infinite. So it will be helpful to review some previous results on (1) and (2) separately.
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• An oracle O such that SampBPPO = SampBQPO: in order to make two classes equal, we can
use the standard method: adding a much more powerful oracle [BGS75]. That is, we set O to
be a PSPACE-complete language, like TQBF. Then it is easy to see both SampBPPTQBF and
SampBQPTQBF become SampPSPACE (i.e., the class of approximate sampling problems solvable
in polynomial space).
• An oracle O such that PHO is infinite: a line of works by Yao [Yao85], Ha˚stad [Has86], and others
constructed relativized worlds where PH is infinite, and a very recent breakthrough by Rossman,
Servedio, and Tan [RST15] even shows that PH is infinite relative to a random oracle with probability
1.
A Failed Attempt: Direct Combination
The first natural idea is to combine the previous two results straightforwardly by setting the oracle to be
TQBF⊕O, where O is a random oracle.
Alas, it is not hard to see that this does not work: while PH is still infinite, a SampBQP algorithm can
perform Fourier Sampling (cf. Definition 6.2) on the random oracle bits, and it is known that no SampBPP
algorithm can do that [AA15] (see also Theorem 6.8). Hence, in this case SampBQP 6= SampBPP.
Another Failed Attempt: Hiding a “Secret Random String” in a Secret Location
The failure of the naive approach suggests that we must somehow “hide” the random oracle bits, since if
the SampBQP algorithm has access to them, then SampBPP and SampBQP will not be equal. More
specifically, we want to hide a “secret random string” among the oracle bits so that:
(1) a PH algorithm can find it, so that PH is still infinite, but
(2) a SampBQP algorithm cannot find it, so that we can still make SampBPP = SampBQP by attach-
ing a TQBF oracle.
Inspired by the so-called cheat-sheet construction [ABDK15], it is natural to consider a direct hid-
ing scheme. Imagine that the oracle bits are partitioned into two parts: one part is logN copies of
the OR function on N bits, and another part is N binary strings y1, . . . , yN , each with length N . Let
t = a1, a2, . . . , alogN ∈ {0, 1}logN be the answer to the copies of OR; we can also interpret t as an integer
in [N ]. Finally, set yt to be a random input, while other yi’s are set to zero.
Intuitively, a PH algorithm can easily evaluate the logN copies of OR and then get access to the random
string; while it is known that OR is hard for a quantum algorithm, so no quantum algorithm should be able
to find the location of the random string efficiently.
Unfortunately, there is a fatal issue with the above approach: a SampBQP algorithm is also given an
input x ∈ {0, 1}n and it may guess that the input x denotes the location of the random string. That is, on
some particular input, the SampBQP algorithm is “lucky” and gets access to the random string, which still
makes SampBPP and SampBQP unequal.
Hiding the “Secret Random String” in a Bunch of OR’s
Therefore, our final construction goes further. Instead of hiding the random string in a secret location amid
the oracle bits, we hide it using a bunch of ORs. That is, suppose we want to provide N uniform random
bits. Then we provide them each as an OR of N bits. In this way, a PH algorithm is still able to access the
random bits, while a quantum algorithm, even if it’s “lucky” with its additional input, still can’t get access
to these hidden random bits.
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5.2 Implementation
The Distribution DO on Oracles.
We first describe formally how to hide a random string inside a bunch of OR’s by defining a distributionDO
on oracles.
For notational convenience, our constructed oracles always map all odd-length binary strings to 0. So
we can alternatively describe such an oracle O by a collection of functions {fn}+∞n=0, where each fn is a
function from {0, 1}2n → {0, 1}. That is, O2n is set to be fn for each n, while the O2n+1’s are all constant
zero functions.
For each string p ∈ {0, 1}n, we use Bn,p to denote the set of strings in {0, 1}2n with p as a prefix.
Now we first define a distribution Dn on functions {0, 1}2n → {0, 1}, from which a sample function fn
is generated as follows: initially, we set fn(x) = 0 for all x ∈ {0, 1}2n; then for each p ∈ {0, 1}n, with
probability 0.5, we pick an element e in Bn,p at uniformly random and set fn(e) = 1. Observe that by
taking the OR of each Bn,p, we get a function g(p) := ∨x∈Bn,pfn(x), which is a uniform random function
from {0, 1}n to {0, 1} by construction.
Finally, theDn’s induce a distributionDO on oracles, which generates an oracleO by drawing fn ∼ Dn
independently for each integer n. That is, we set O2n to be fn, and O2n+1 to be 0, for each n.
Having defined the distribution DO, we are ready to state our result formally.
Theorem 5.1. For an oracle O drawn from the distribution DO, the following two statements hold with
probability 1:
• SampBPPTQBF,O = SampBQPTQBF,O.
• PHTQBF,O is infinite.
From which our desired result follows immediately.
Corollary 5.2. There exists an oracleO′ = TQBF⊕O such that SampBPPO′ = SampBQPO′ and PHO′
is infinite.
The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 5.1.
5.3 SampBPPTQBF,O = SampBQPTQBF,O with Probability 1.
We first describe an algorithm for simulating SampBQPTQBF,O in SampBPPTQBF,O, thereby proving the
first part of Theorem 5.1. In the following, we assume that all oracle algorithms are given access to two
oracles, TQBF and O.
Given a SampBQP oracle algorithm M , our central task is to give a SampBPP oracle algorithm that
simulates M closely. Formally:
Lemma 5.3. For any SampBQP oracle algorithm M , there is a SampBPP oracle algorithm A such that:
Let O be an oracle drawn from DO, and let DMx,ε and DAx,ε be the distributions output by MTQBF,O and
ATQBF,O respectively on input 〈x, 01/ε〉. Then with probability at least 1− exp{−(2 · |x|+ 1/ε)}, we have
‖DMx,ε −DAx,ε‖ ≤ ε.
Before proving Lemma 5.3, we show it implies the first part of Theorem 5.1.
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Proof of the first part of Theorem 5.1. Fix a SampBQP oracle algorithm M , and let O be an oracle drawn
from DO. We first show that with probability 1, there is a classical algorithm AM such that
‖DMx,ε −DAMx,ε ‖ ≤ ε for all x ∈ {0, 1}∗ and ε = 2−k for some integer k. (4)
Let A be the SampBPP algorithm guaranteed by Lemma 5.3. For an input x ∈ {0, 1}∗ and an integer
k, we call (x, k) a bad pair if ‖DMx,2−k −DAx,2−k‖ > 2−k. By Lemma 5.3, the expected number of bad pairs
is upper-bounded by
+∞∑
n=1
2n ·
+∞∑
k=1
exp(−(2n+ 2k)) ≤
+∞∑
n=1
+∞∑
k=1
exp(−(n+ k)) ≤ O(1).
This means that with probability 1, there are only finitely many bad pairs, so we can handle them by
hardwiring their results into the algorithm A to get the algorithm AM we want.
Since there are only countably many SampBQP oracle algorithms M , we see with probability 1, for
every SampBQP oracle algorithm M , there is a classical algorithm AM such that (4) holds. We claim that
in that case, SampBQPTQBF,O = SampBPPTQBF,O.
Let S be a sampling problem in SampBQPTQBF,O. This means that there is a SampBQP oracle
algorithm M , such that for all x ∈ {0, 1}∗ and ε, we have ‖DMx,ε − Sx‖ ≤ ε. Let AM be the corresponding
SampBPP algorithm. Now consider the following algorithmA′: given input 〈x, 01/ε〉, let k be the smallest
integer such that 2−k ≤ ε/2; then run AM on input 〈x, 02k〉 to get a sample from DAMx,2−k .
Since
‖DA′x,ε − Sx‖ = ‖DAMx,2−k − Sx‖
≤ ‖DMx,2−k −DAMx,2−k‖+ ‖DMx,2−k − Sx‖ ≤ 2 · 2−k ≤ ε,
this means that A′ solves S and S ∈ SampBPPTQBF,O. So SampBQPTQBF,O ⊆ SampBPPTQBF,O with
probability 1, which completes the proof.
We now prove Lemma 5.3, which is the most technical part of the whole section.
Proof of Lemma 5.3. Recall that from the canonical description in Section 2.2, there exists a fixed poly-
nomial p, such that given input 〈x, 01/ε〉, the machine M first constructs a quantum circuit C with N =
p(|x|, 1/ε) qubits and N gates classically (C can contain TQBF and O gates). We first set up some nota-
tion.
Notation. Recall that O can be specified by a collection of functions {fn}+∞n=0, where each fn maps
{0, 1}2n to {0, 1}. Without loss of generality, we can assume that all the O gates act on an even number of
qubits, and for each n, all the fn gates act on the first 2n qubits.
For a function f : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}, we use Uf to denote the unitary operator mapping |i〉 to (−1)f(i)|i〉
for i ∈ {0, 1}k.
Suppose there are T O-gates in total, and suppose the i-th O-gate is an fni gate. Then the unitary
operator U applied by the circuit C can be decomposed as
U = UT+1(UfnT ⊗ IN−2nT ) · · · (Ufn2 ⊗ IN−2n2)U2(Ufn1 ⊗ IN−2n1)U1,
where the Ui’s are the unitary operators corresponding to the sub-circuits which don’t contain an O gate.
Our algorithm proceeds by replacing eachO-gate by a much simpler gate, one by one, without affecting
the final quantum state too much. It then simulates the final circuit with the help of the TQBF oracle.
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Replacing the t-th O-gate. Suppose we have already replaced the first t− 1 O-gates. That is, for each
i ∈ [t − 1], we replaced the fni gate (the i-th O-gate) with a gi gate, and now we are going to replace the
t-th O-gate.
Let
|v〉 = Ut(Ugt−1 ⊗ IN−2nt−1) · · · (Ug2 ⊗ IN−2n2)U2(Ug1 ⊗ IN−2n1)U1|0〉⊗N ,
which is the quantum state right before the t-th O gate in the circuit after the replacement.
For brevity, we use f to denote the function fnt , and we drop the subscript t of nt when it is clear from
context.
Analysis of incurred error. The t-thO-gate is an f gate. If we replace it by a g gate, the change to the
quantum state is
‖Uf ⊗ IN−2n|v〉 − Ug ⊗ IN−2n|v〉‖ = ‖(Uf − Ug)⊗ IN−2n|v〉‖.
We can analyze the above deviation by bounding its square. Let H be the Hilbert space spanned by the
last N − 2n qubits, and let ρ = TrH [|v〉〈v|]. Then we have
‖((Uf − Ug)⊗ IN−2n)|v〉‖2
=Tr
[
(Uf − Ug)†(Uf − Ug)⊗ IN−2n|v〉〈v|
]
=Tr
[
(Uf − Ug)†(Uf − Ug)ρ
]
.
Note that
(Uf − Ug)†(Uf − Ug) = 4
∑
f(i)6=g(i)
|i〉〈i|
from the definition. So we can further simplify the above trace as
Tr
[
(Uf − Ug)†(Uf − Ug)ρ
]
= 4
∑
f(i) 6=g(i)
Tr [|i〉〈i|ρ] = 4
∑
f(i) 6=g(i)
〈i|ρ|i〉. (5)
Now, ρ is a (mixed) quantum state on the first 2n bits, and 〈i|ρ|i〉 is the probability of seeing i when
measuring ρ in the computational basis. So we can define a probability distribution Q on {0, 1}2n by
Q(i) := 〈i|ρ|i〉.
Using the distribution Q, the error term (5) can finally be simplified as:
4
∑
i∈{0,1}2n
Q(i) · [f(i) 6= g(i)] = 4 · Pr
i∼Q
[f(i) 6= g(i)], (6)
where [f(i) 6= g(i)] is the indicator function that takes value 1 when f(i) 6= g(i) and 0 otherwise.
A posterior distribution Dpostn on functions from {0, 1}2n → {0, 1}. Now, recall that f = fn is a
function drawn from the distribution Dn. Our goal is to replace f by another simple function g, such that
with high probability, the introduced deviation (6) is small.
Note that when replacing the t-th O gate, we may already have previously queried some contents of
f (i.e., it is not the first fn gate in the circuit). So we need to consider the posterior distribution Dpostn
on functions from {0, 1}2n → {0, 1}. That is, we want a function g, such that with high probability over
f ∼ Dpostn , the error term (6) is small.
We use a function fknown : {0, 1}2n → {0, 1, ∗} to encode our knowledge: if f(i) is not queried, then
we set fknown(i) := ∗; otherwise we set fknown(i) := f(i). Then Dpostn is simply the distribution obtained
from Dn by conditioning on the event that f is consistent with fknown.
We can now work out the posterior distribution Dpostn from the definition of Dn and Bayes’ rule.
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For f ∼ Dpostn , we can see that all the sets Bn,p (recall that Bn,p is the set of all strings in {0, 1}2n with
p as a prefix) are still independent. So we can consider each set separately.
For each p ∈ {0, 1}n, if there is an x ∈ Bn,p such that fknown(x) = 1, then by the construction of Dn,
all other elements y ∈ Bn,p must satisfy f(y) = 0.
Otherwise, if there is no x ∈ Bn,p such that fknown(x) = 1, then we set Zp = |{fknown(x) = 0 | x ∈
Bn,p}| and note that |Bn,p| = 2n. By Bayes’ rule, we see that with probability 1
2− Zp · 2−n , all y ∈ Bn,p
satisfy f(y) = 0; and for each y ∈ Bn,p such that fknown(y) = ∗, with probability 2
−n
2− Zp · 2−n , we have
that y is the only element of Bn,p that satisfies f(y) = 1.
Construction and Analysis of g. Our construction of g goes as follows: we first set g(x) = fknown(x)
for all x such that fknown(x) 6= ∗. Then for a parameter τ which will be specified later, we query all
x ∈ {0, 1}2n with Q(x) ≥ τ , and set g(x) = f(x) for them. For all other positions of g, we simply set
them to zero. Hence, there are at most O(1/τ) + W ones in g, where W denotes the number of ones in
fknown.
The following three properties of g are immediate from the construction.
• f(x) 6= g(x) implies Q(x) ≤ τ. (7)
• g(x) = 1 implies f(x) = g(x). (8)
• For each p ∈ {0, 1}n, there is at most one x ∈ Bn,p with f(x) 6= g(x). (9)
Upper bounding the deviation (6). Now we are going to show that Pr
x∼Q
[f(x) 6= g(x)] is very small,
with overwhelming probability over the posterior distribution Dpostn .
We first define 2n random variables {Xp}p∈{0,1}n , where Xp =
∑
x∈Bn,p
Q(x) · [f(x) 6= g(x)] for each
p ∈ {0, 1}n. By the construction of Dpostn , we can see that all Xp’s are independent. Moreover, by
properties (7) and (9), there is at most one x ∈ Bn,p such that f(x) 6= g(x), and that x must satisfy
Q(x) ≤ τ . Therefore Xp ∈ [0, τ ] for every p.
Let X =
∑
p∈{0,1}n
Xp, and µ = E[X]. Alternatively, we can write X as
X =
∑
x∈{0,1}2n
Q(x) · [f(x) 6= g(x)],
so
µ =
∑
x∈{0,1}2n
Q(x) · E[f(x) 6= g(x)].
We claim that E[f(x) 6= g(x)] ≤ 2−n for all x ∈ {0, 1}2n, and consequently µ ≤ 2−n. Fix an
x ∈ {0, 1}2n, and suppose x ∈ Bn,p. When g(x) = 1, we must have f(x) = g(x) by property (8). When
g(x) = 0, by the definition of Dpostn , we have f(x) = 1 with probability at most
2−n
2− Zp · 2−n ≤ 2
−n. So
E[f(i) 6= g(i)] ≤ 2−n in both cases and the claim is established.
Applying the Chernoff Bound. Set δ =
µ−1ε4
32T 2
. If δ ≤ 1, then we have
32T 2ε−4 ≥ µ−1 ≥ 2n.
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This means that we can simply query all the positions in fn using 22n = O(T 4 · ε−8) queries, as this
bound is polynomial in |x| and 1/ε (recall that T ≤ N = p(|x|, 1/ε)).
Hence, we can assume that δ > 1. So by Corollary 2.7, we have
Pr [X ≥ 2δµ] ≤ Pr [X ≥ (1 + δ)µ] ≤ exp
{
−δµ
3τ
}
.
Finally, we set τ =
ε4
96T 2 · (2n+ ε−1 + lnT ) .
Therefore, with probability
1− exp
{
−δµ
3τ
}
= 1− exp(−(2n+ ε−1 + lnT )) = 1− exp(−(2n+ ε
−1)
T
,
we have
‖(Uf − Ug)⊗ IN−2n|v〉‖2 = 4 ·X ≤ 8δµ = ε
4
4T 2
,
which in turn implies
‖(Uf − Ug)⊗ IN−2n|v〉‖ ≤ ε
2
2T
.
Moreover, we can verify that g only has O(1/τ) +W = poly(n, 1/ε) ones.
Analysis of the final circuit Cfinal. Suppose that at the end, for each t ∈ [T ], our algorithm has replaced
the t-th O-gate with a gt gate, where gt is a function from {0, 1}2nt to {0, 1}. Let Cfinal be the circuit after
the replacement.
Let
V = UT+1(UgT ⊗ IN−2nT ) · · · (Ug2 ⊗ IN−2n2)U2(Ug1 ⊗ IN−2n1)U1
be the unitary operator corresponding to Cfinal. Also, recall that U is the unitary operator corresponding to
the original circuit C. We are going to show that U |0〉⊗N and V |0〉⊗N , the final quantum states produced
by U and V respectively, are very close.
We first define a sequence of intermediate quantum states. Let |u1〉 = U1|0〉⊗N . Then for each t > 1,
we define
|ut〉 = Ut(Ufnt−1 ⊗ IN−2nt−1)|ut−1〉.
That is, |ut〉 is the quantum state immediately before applying the t-th O-gate in the original circuit. Simi-
larly, we let |v1〉 = U1|0〉⊗N , and
|vt〉 = Ut(Ugt−1 ⊗ IN−2nt−1)|ut−1〉
for each t > 1.
From the analysis of our algorithm, over O ∼ DO, for each t ∈ [T ], with probability 1 − exp(−(2n +
ε−1))/T , we have
‖Ufnt ⊗ IN−2nt |vt〉 − Ugt ⊗ IN−2nt |vt〉‖ ≤
ε2
2T
. (10)
So by a simple union bound, with probability at least 1− exp(−(2n+ ε−1)), the above bound holds for
all t ∈ [T ]. We claim that in this case, for each t ∈ [T + 1], we have
‖|vt〉 − |ut〉‖ ≤ (t− 1) · ε
2
2T
. (11)
We prove this by induction. Clearly it is true for t = 1. When t > 1, suppose (11) holds for t− 1; then
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‖|vt〉 − |ut〉‖ =‖Ut(Ogt−1 ⊗ IN−2nt−1)|vt−1〉 − Ut(fnt−1 ⊗ IN−2nt−1)|ut−1〉‖
=‖Ugt−1 ⊗ IN−2nt−1 |vt−1〉 − Ufnt−1 ⊗ IN−2nt−1 |ut−1〉‖
≤‖Ugt−1 ⊗ IN−2nt−1 |vt−1〉 − Ufnt−1 ⊗ IN−2nt−1 |vt−1〉‖
+ ‖Ufnt−1 ⊗ IN−2nt−1 |vt−1〉 − Ufnt−1 ⊗ IN−2nt−1 |ut−1〉‖
≤ ε
2
2T
+ ‖|ut−1〉 − |vt−1〉‖ ≤ (t− 1) · ε
2
2T
,
where the second line holds by the fact that Ut is unitary, the third line holds by the triangle inequality, and
the last line holds by (10) and the induction hypothesis.
Upper-bounding the error. Therefore, with probability at least 1− exp(−(2n+ ε−1)), we have
‖|vT+1〉 − |uT+1〉‖ = ‖U |0〉⊗N − V |0〉⊗N‖ ≤ ε
2
2
.
Now, our classical algorithm A then simulates stage 2 and 3 of the SampBQP algorithm M straightfor-
wardly. That is, it first takes a sample z by measuring |vT+1〉 in the computational basis, and then outputs
Aoutput(z) as its sample, where Aoutput is the classical algorithm used by M in stage 3.
From our previous analysis, A queries the oracle only poly(n, 1/ε) times. In addition, it is not hard to
see that all the computations can be done in PSPACE, and therefore can be implemented in poly(n, 1/ε)
time with the help of the TQBF oracle. So A is a SampBPP algorithm.
By Corollary 2.5, with probability at least 1− exp(−(2n+ ε−1)), the distribution DAx,ε outputted by A
satisfies
‖DAx,ε −DMx,ε‖ ≤
√
2 · ε
2
2
= ε,
and this completes the proof of Lemma 5.3.
5.4 PHTQBF,O is Infinite with Probability 1.
For the second part of Theorem 5.1, we resort to the well-known connection between PH and constant-depth
circuit lower bounds.
The Average Case Constant-depth Circuit Lower Bound.
For convenience, we will use the recent breakthrough result by Rossman, Servedio, and Tan [RST15], which
shows that PH is infinite relative to a random oracle with probability 1. (Earlier constructions of oracles
making PH infinite would also have worked for us, but a random oracle is a particularly nice choice.)
Theorem 5.4. Let 2 ≤ d ≤ c
√
log n
log log n
, where c > 0 is an absolute constant. Let Sipserd be the explicit
n-variable read-once monotone depth-d formula described in [RST15]. Then any circuit C ′ of depth at
most d− 1 and size at most S = 2n
1
6(d−1)
over {0, 1}n agrees with Sipserd on at most (
1
2
+ n−Ω(1/d)) · 2n
inputs.
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Dn as a Distribution on {0, 1}22n .
In order to use the above result to prove the second part of Theorem 5.1, we need to interpret Dn (originally
a distribution over functions mapping {0, 1}2n to {0, 1}) as a distribution on {0, 1}22n in the following way.
Let τ be the bijection between [22n] and {0, 1}2n that maps an integer i ∈ [22n] to the i-th binary string
in {0, 1}2n in lexicographic order. Then a function f : {0, 1}2n → {0, 1} is equivalent to a binary string
xf ∈ {0, 1}22n , where the i-th bit of xf , denoted xfi , equals f(τ(i)). Clearly this is a bijection between
functions from {0, 1}2n to {0, 1} and binary strings in {0, 1}22n .
For notational simplicity, when we say a binary string x ∈ {0, 1}22n is drawn from Dn, it means x is
generated by first drawing a sample function f ∼ Dn and then setting x = xf .
Note that for p ∈ {0, 1}n, if p is the i-th binary string in {0, 1}n, then the set Bn,p corresponds to the
bits x(i−1)2n+1, . . . , xi2n .
Distributional Constant-Depth Circuit Lower Bound over Dn
Now we are ready to state our distributional circuit lower bound over Dn formally.
Lemma 5.5. For an integer n, letN = 2n and Sipserd be theN -variable Sipser function as in Theorem 5.4.
Consider the Boolean function (Sipserd ◦ OR) on {0, 1}N
2
defined as follows:
Given inputs x1, x2, . . . , xN2 , for each 1 ≤ i ≤ N , set
zi := ∨iNj=(i−1)N+1xj ,
and
(Sipserd ◦ OR)(x) := Sipserd(z).
Then any circuit C ′ of depth at most d − 1 and size at most S = 2N
1
6(d−1)
over {0, 1}N2 agrees with
(Sipserd ◦ OR) with probability at most
1
2
+N−Ω(1/d) when inputs are drawn from the distribution Dn.
Before proving Lemma 5.5, we show that it implies the second part of Theorem 5.1 easily.
Proof of the second part of Theorem 5.1. Consider the function (Sipserd ◦ OR) defined as in Lemma 5.5.
It is easy to see that it has a polynomial-size circuit (in fact, a formula) of depth d + 1; and by Lemma 5.5,
every polynomial size circuit of depth d − 1 has at most 1
2
+ o(1) correlation with it when the inputs are
drawn from the distributionDn. So it follows from the standard connection between PH and AC0 that PHO
is infinite with probability 1 when O ∼ DO.
Finally, we prove Lemma 5.5.
Proof of Lemma 5.5. By Theorem 5.4, there is a universal constant c, such that any circuit C of depth at
most d− 1 and size at most S over {0, 1}N agrees with Sipserd on at most
(
1
2
+N−c/d
)
· 2N inputs.
We are going to show this lemma holds for the same c. Suppose not; then we have a circuit C of depth
at most d− 1 and size at most S = 2N
1
6(d−1)
over {0, 1}N2 , such that
Pr
x∼Dn
[C(x) = (Sipserd ◦ OR)(x)] >
1
2
+N−c/d.
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Now, for each y1, y2, . . . , yN ∈ [N ]N , we define a distribution Dy1,y2,...,yNn on {0, 1}N
2
as follows. To
generate a sample x ∼ Dy1,y2,...,yNn , we first set x = 0N
2
. Then for each i ∈ [N ], we set x(i−1)N+yi to 1
with probability 1/2.
By construction, we can see for all x in the support of Dy1,y2,...,yNn ,
(Sipserd ◦ OR)(x) = Sipserd(xy1 , xN+y2 , x2N+y3 , . . . , x(N−1)N+yN ).
Moreover, by definition, Dn is just the average of these distributions:
Dn = N−N ·
∑
y1,y2,...,yN
Dy1,y2,...,yNn .
By an averaging argument, there exist y1, y2, . . . , yN ∈ [N ]N such that
Pr
x∼Dy1,y2,...,yNn
[C(x) = (Sipserd ◦ OR)(x)] >
1
2
+N−c/d.
Setting x(i−1)N+yi = zi for each i, and all other inputs to 0 in the circuit C, we then have a circuit
D of size at most S and depth at most d − 1 over {0, 1}N . And by the construction of Dy1,y2,...,yNn and
the definition of the function (Sipserd ◦ OR), we see that D agrees with Sipserd on at least a
1
2
+ N−c/d
fraction of inputs. But this is a contradiction.
6 Maximal Quantum Supremacy for Black-Box Sampling and Relation Prob-
lems
In this section we present our results about Fourier Fishing and Fourier Sampling.
We will establish an Ω(N/ logN) lower bound on the classical query complexity of Fourier Fishing,
as well as an optimal Ω(N) lower bound on the classical query complexity of Fourier Sampling.
6.1 Preliminaries
We begin by introducing some useful notations. Throughout this section, given a function f : {0, 1}n →
{−1, 1}, we define the Fourier coefficient
f̂(z) = 2−n/2
∑
x∈{0,1}n
f(x) · (−1)x·z
for each z ∈ {0, 1}n.
We also define
adv(f) := 2−n ·
∑
z∈{0,1}n,|f̂(z)|≥1
f̂(z)2,
and set N = 2n.
The following two constants will be used frequently in this section.
SuccQ =
2√
2pi
∫ +∞
1
x2e−x
2/2dx ≈ 0.801 and SuccR = 2√
2pi
∫ +∞
1
e−x
2/2dx ≈ 0.317.
Finally, we use Un to denote the uniform distribution on functions f : {0, 1}n → {−1, 1}.
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An Approximate Formula for the Binomial Coefficients
We also need the following lemma to approximate the binomial coefficients to ease some calculations in our
proofs.
Lemma 6.1. ((5.41) in [Spe14]) For value n and |k − n/2| = o(n2/3), we have(
n
k
)
≈
(
n
n/2
)
· e−
(k−n/2)2
n/2
and
ln
(
n
k
)
= ln
(
n
n/2
)
− (k − n/2)
2
n/2
+ o(1).
6.2 Fourier Fishing and Fourier Sampling
We now formally define the Fourier Fishing and the Fourier Sampling problems.
Definition 6.2. We are given oracle access to a function f : {0, 1}n → {−1, 1}.
In Fourier Sampling (or Fsampling in short), our task is to sample from a distribution D over {0, 1}n
such that ‖D − Df‖ ≤ ε, where Df is the distribution defined by
Pr
Df
[y] = 2−nf̂(y)2 =
 1
2n
∑
x∈{0,1}n
f(x)(−1)x·y
2 .
In Fourier Fishing (or Ffishing in short), we want to find a z such that |f̂(z)| ≥ 1. We also define
a promise version of Fourier Fishing (promise-Ffishing for short), where the function f is promised to
satisfy adv(f) ≥ SuccQ − 1
n
.
A Simple 1-Query Quantum Algorithm
Next we describe a simple 1-query quantum algorithm for both problems. It consists of a round of Hadamard
gates, then a query to f , then another round of Hadamard gates, then a measurement in the computational
basis.
The following lemma follows directly from the definitions of Fsampling and Ffishing.
Lemma 6.3. Given oracle access to a function f : {0, 1}n → {−1, 1}, the above algorithm solves
Fsampling exactly (i.e. with ε = 0), and Ffishing with probability adv(f).
We can now explain the meanings of the constants SuccQ and SuccR. When the function f is drawn
from Un, by a simple calculation, we can see that SuccQ is the success probability for the above simple
quantum algorithm on Fourier Fishing, and SuccR is the success probability for an algorithm outputting a
uniform random string in {0, 1}n.
6.3 The Ω(N/ logN) Lower Bound for Fourier Fishing
We begin with the Ω(N/ logN) randomized lower bound for Fourier Fishing. Formally:
Theorem 6.4. There is no o(N/ logN)-query randomized algorithm that solves promise-Ffishing with
SuccR + Ω(1) success probability.
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To prove Theorem 6.4, we first show that when the function f is drawn from Un, no classical algorithm
with o(N/ logN) queries can solve Ffishing with probability SuccR + Ω(1); we then show with high
probability, a function f ← Un satisfies the promise of promise-Ffishing. Formally, we have the following
two lemmas.
Lemma 6.5. For large enough n,
Pr
f←Un
[
adv(f) < SuccQ − 1
n
]
<
1
n
.
Lemma 6.6. Over f ← Un, no randomized algorithm with o(N/ logN) queries can solve Ffishing with
probability
SuccR + Ω(1).
Before proving these two technical lemmas, we show that they together imply Theorem 6.4 easily.
Proof of Theorem 6.4. Suppose by contradiction that there is an o(N/ logN) query randomized algorithm
Awhich has a SuccR+Ω(1) success probability for promise-Ffishing. From Lemma 6.5, a 1−o(1) fraction
of all functions from {0, 1}n → {−1, 1} satisfy the promise of promise-Ffishing. Therefore, when the
sample function f is drawn from Uf , with probability 1− o(1) it satisfies the promise of promise-Ffishing,
and consequently A has a SuccR + Ω(1) success probability of solving Ffishing with that f . This means
that A has a success probability of
(1− o(1)) · (SuccR + Ω(1)) = SuccR + Ω(1)
when f ← Un, contradicting Lemma 6.6.
The proof of Lemma 6.5 is based on a tedious calculation so we defer it to Appendix C. Now we prove
Lemma 6.6.
Proof of Lemma 6.6. By Yao’s principle, it suffices to consider only deterministic algorithms, and we can
assume the algorithm A makes exactly t = o(N/ logN) queries without loss of generality.
Notations. Suppose that at the end of the algorithm, A has queried the entries in a subset S ⊆ {0, 1}n
such that |S| = t.
For each z ∈ {0, 1}n, we define
f̂seen(z) =
1√
t
∑
x∈S
f(x) · (−1)x·z
and similarly
f̂unseenf(z) =
1√
N − t
∑
x∈{0,1}n\S
f(x) · (−1)x·z.
From the definitions of f̂(z), f̂seen(z) and f̂unseen(z), and note that N/t = ω(logN) = ω(lnN), we
have
f̂(z) =
(√
t · f̂seen(z) +
√
N − t · f̂unseen(z)
)/√
N
= f̂seen(z)/ω(
√
lnN) + f̂unseen(z) · (1− o(1)). (12)
W.h.p. f̂seen(z) is small for all z ∈ {0, 1}n. We first show that, with probability at least 1 − o(1) over
f ← Un, we have |f̂seen(z)| ≤ 2
√
lnN for all z ∈ {0, 1}n.
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Fix a z ∈ {0, 1}n, and note that for the algorithm A, even though which position to query next might
depend on the history, the value in that position is a uniform random bit in {−1, 1}. So f̂seen(z) is a sum of
t uniform i.i.d. random variables in {−1, 1}.
Therefore, the probability that |f̂seen(z)| > 2
√
lnN for this fixed z is
2√
2pi
∫ +∞
2
√
lnN
e−x
2/2dx = o
(
1
N
)
.
Then by a simple union bound, with probability 1− o(1), there is no z ∈ {0, 1}n such that |f̂seen(z)| >
2
√
lnN at the end of t queries. We denote the nonexistence of such a z as the event Ebad.
The lower bound. In the following we condition on Ebad. We show in this case, A cannot solve
Ffishing with a success probability better than SuccR, thereby proving the lower bound.
From (12), for each z ∈ {0, 1}n, we have
f̂(z) = o(1) + f̂unseen(z) · (1− o(1)).
Therefore, the probability of |f̂(z)| ≥ 1 is bounded by the probability that |f̂unseen(z)| ≥ 1 − o(1).
Since f̂unseen(z) is independent of all the seen values in S, we have
Pr
[
f̂unseen(z) ≥ 1− o(1)
]
=
2√
2pi
∫ +∞
1−o(1)
e−x
2/2dx
=
2√
2pi
∫ +∞
1
e−x
2/2dx+ o(1)
= SuccR + o(1).
Hence, no matter which z is outputted by A, we have |f̂(z)| ≥ 1 with probability at most SuccR + o(1).
That means that if we condition on Ebad, then A cannot solve Ffishing with probability SuccR + Ω(1). As
Ebad happens with probability 1− o(1), this finishes the proof.
6.4 The Optimal Ω(N) Lower Bound for Fourier Sampling
We first show that in fact, Lemma 6.6 already implies an Ω(N/ logN) lower bound for Fourier Sampling,
which holds for a quite large ε.
Theorem 6.7. For any ε < SuccQ − SuccR ≈ 0.483, the randomized query complexity for Fsampling is
Ω(N/ logN).
Proof. Note when f ← Un, an exact algorithm for Fsampling can be used to solve Ffishing with proba-
bility SuccQ. Hence, a sampling algorithm for Fsampling with total variance ≤ ε can solve Ffishing with
probability at least SuccQ − ε, when f ← Un.
Then the lower bound follows directly from Lemma 6.6.
Next we prove the optimal Ω(N) lower bound for Fourier Sampling.
Theorem 6.8. There is a constant ε > 0, such that any randomized algorithm solving Fsampling with error
at most ε needs Ω(N) queries.
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Proof. Reduction to a simpler problem. Sampling problems are hard to approach, so we first reduce to a
much simpler problem with Boolean output (“accept” or “reject”).
Let A be a randomized algorithm for Fsampling with total variance ≤ ε. For a function f : {0, 1}n →
{−1, 1} and y ∈ {0, 1}n, we set pf,y to be the probability that A outputs y with oracle access to f .
By the definition of Fsampling, for all f , we have
1
2
∑
y∈{0,1}n
∣∣∣pf,y − 2−nf̂(y)2∣∣∣ ≤ ε.
By an averaging argument, this implies that there exists a y∗ ∈ {0, 1}n such that
E
f←Un
[∣∣∣pf,y∗ − 2−nf̂(y∗)2∣∣∣] ≤ 2ε
N
.
Then by Markov’s inequality, we have∣∣∣pf,y − 2−nf̂(y∗)2∣∣∣ ≤ 400ε
N
,
for at least a 199/200 fraction of f ’s. Now we set ε =
1
400
· 1
100
.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that y∗ = 0n. Let zi :=
1 + f(xi)
2
(where x1, x2, . . . , xN is
a lexicographic ordering of inputs), Z := (z1, . . . , zN ) and |Z| :=
N∑
i=1
zi. Then we have
2−nf̂(0n)2 =
(
2|Z|
N
− 1
)2
.
Now we can simplify the question to one of how many zi’s the algorithm A needs to query, in order to
output 0n (we call it “accept” for convenience) with a probability pZ = pf,0n that satisfies∣∣∣∣∣pZ −
(
2|Z|
N
− 1
)2∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 400εN ≤ 0.01N (13)
with probability at least 199/200 over Z ∈ {0, 1}N .
Analysis of the acceptance probability of A. Without loss of generality, we can assume that A non-
adaptively queries t randomly-chosen inputs zi1 , zi2 , . . . , zit , and then accepts with a probability qk that
depends solely on k := zi1 + · · · + zit . The reason is that we can change any other algorithm into this
restricted form by averaging over all N ! permutations of Z without affecting its correctness.
Let pw be the probability that A accepts when |Z| = w. Then
pw =
t∑
k=0
qk · rk,w,
where rk,w :=
(
t
k
)(
N − t
w − k
)/(N
w
)
, is the probability that zi1 + · · ·+ zit = k conditioned on |Z| = w.
Construction and Analysis of the sets U, V,W . Now, consider the following three sets:
U :=
{
Z :
∣∣∣∣|Z| − N2
∣∣∣∣ ≤
√
N
20
}
,
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V :=
{
Z :
(
1− 1
20
) √
N
2
≤ |Z| − N
2
≤
√
N
2
}
,
W :=
{
Z :
(
1− 1
20
)√
N ≤ |Z| − N
2
≤
√
N
}
.
We calculate the probability that a uniform random Z belongs to these three sets. For a sufficiently
large N , we have
Pr
Z
[Z ∈ U ] ≥ erf
(√
2
20
)
− o(1) > 0.075,
Pr
Z
[Z ∈ V ] ≥ 1
2
·
(
erf
(√
2
2
)
− erf
(√
2
2
· 19
20
))
− o(1) > 0.01,
Pr
Z
[Z ∈W ] ≥ 1
2
·
(
erf(
√
2)− erf
(√
2 · 19
20
))
− o(1) > 0.005.
Construction and Analysis of w0, w1, w2. Since all Pr
Z
[Z ∈ U ],Pr
Z
[Z ∈ V ],Pr
Z
[Z ∈ W ] > 0.005, and
recall that for at least a 1− 0.005 fraction of Z, we have∣∣∣∣∣pZ −
(
2|Z|
N
− 1
)2∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 400εN ≤ 0.01N .
So there must exist w0 ∈ U,w1 ∈ V,w2 ∈W such that∣∣∣∣∣pwi − 4 ·
(
wi −N/2
N
)2∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 0.01N (14)
for each i ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
To ease our calculation, let ui =
wi −N/2√
N
, then we have wi = N/2 + ui
√
N . By the definition of the
ui’s, we also have |u0| ≤ 1
20
, u1 ∈ [0.475, 0.5], u2 ∈ [0.95, 1].
Plugging in ui’s, for each i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, equation (14) simplifies to∣∣∣∣pwi − 4u2iN
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 0.01N . (15)
We can calculate the ranges of the pwi’s by plugging the ranges of the ui’s,
pw0 ≤
0.02
N
,
pw1 ∈
[
0.952 − 0.01
N
,
1 + 0.01
N
]
⊆
[
0.89
N
,
1.01
N
]
,
pw2 ∈
[
4 · 0.952 − 0.01
N
,
4 + 0.01
N
]
⊆
[
3.6
N
,
4.01
N
]
.
We are going to show that the above is impossible when t = o(N). That is, one cannot set the qk’s in
such a way that all pwi’s satisfy the above constraints when t = o(N).
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It is safe to set qk to zero when |k − t/2| is large. To simplify the matters, we first show that we can
set nearly all the qk’s to zero. By the Chernoff bound without replacement, for each wi and large enough c
we have ∑
k:|k−t/2|>c√t
rk,wi
= Pr
[∣∣∣∣zi1 + · · ·+ zit − t2
∣∣∣∣ ≥ c√t : |Z| = wi = N2 + ui√N
]
≤ Pr
[∣∣∣∣zi1 + · · ·+ zit − ( t2 + uit√N
)∣∣∣∣ ≥ c√t− ∣∣∣∣( t2 + uit√N
)
− t
2
∣∣∣∣ : |Z| = wi = N2 + ui√N
]
≤ Pr
[∣∣∣∣zi1 + · · ·+ zit − ( t2 + uit√N
)∣∣∣∣ ≥ c√t− |ui|√t : |Z| = N2 + ui√N
]
(
t√
N
≤ √t)
≤ exp
{
−2(c
√
t− |ui|
√
t)2
t
}
= exp
{−2(c− |ui|)2}
≤ exp{Ω(c2)} .
Then we can set c = c1
√
lnN for a sufficiently large constant c1, so that for all wi’s,∑
k:|k−t/2|>c√t
rk,wi ≤
1
N2
.
This means that we can simply set all qk’s with |k − t/2| > c
√
t = c1
√
t lnN to zero, and only consider k
such that |k− t/2| ≤ c1
√
t lnN , as this only changes each pwi by a negligible value. From now on, we call
an integer k valid, if |k − t/2| ≤ c1
√
t lnN .
Either
rk,w0
rk,w1
≥ 0.05 or rk,w2
rk,w1
≥ 10. Now, we are going to show the most technical part of this proof:
for all valid k, we have either
rk,w0
rk,w1
≥ 0.05 or rk,w2
rk,w1
≥ 10. (16)
Suppose for contradiction that there is a valid k that satisfies
rk,w0
rk,w1
< 0.05 and
rk,w2
rk,w1
< 10. (17)
Estimation of rk,wi’s. We first use Lemma 6.1 to derive an accurate estimate of ln rk,wi for each wi.
We set Nt = N − t for simplicity. Recall that
rk,w =
(
t
k
)(
Nt
w − k
)/(N
w
)
.
For each wi, since |k − t/2| ≤ c1
√
t lnN and t = o(N), we have∣∣∣∣wi − k − Nt2
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∣wi − N2
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣k − t2
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ui√N + c1√t lnN = o(N2/3t ),
and note that |wi −N/2| = |ui
√
N | = o(N2/3). So we can apply Lemma 6.1 to derive
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ln rk,wi = ln
(
t
k
)
+ ln
(
Nt
wi − k
)
− ln
(
N
wi
)
= −(wi − k −Nt/2)
2
Nt/2
+
(wi −N/2)2
N/2
+ C + ln
(
t
k
)
+ o(1),
in which C is a constant that does not depend on k or wi.
Let d = (k − t/2)/√t (so k = t/2 + d√t), and recall that wi = N/2 + ui
√
N for each wi. We can
further simplify the expression as
ln rk,wi = −
(N/2 + ui
√
N − t/2− d√t−Nt/2)2
Nt/2
+
(N/2 + ui
√
N −N/2)2
N/2
+ C + ln
(
t
k
)
+ o(1)
= −(ui
√
N − d√t)2
Nt/2
+ 2u2i + C + ln
(
t
k
)
+ o(1).
Estimation of
rk,wj
rk,wi
. Note that Nt = N − t = (1− o(1))N . So we can approximate the ratio between
two rk,wi and rk,wj by
ln
rk,wj
rk,wi
= ln rk,wj − ln rk,wi
= −(uj
√
N − d√t)2
Nt/2
+ 2u2j +
(ui
√
N − d√t)2
Nt/2
− 2u2i + o(1)
= 2u2j − 2u2i +
((ui + uj)
√
N − 2d√t)(ui − uj)
√
N
Nt/2
+ o(1)
= 2u2j − 2u2i + 2(u2i − u2j )− 4d
√
tN
Nt
(ui − uj) + o(1)
= −4d
√
tN
Nt
(ui − uj) + o(1).
Verifying (16). Finally, to simplify matters further, we set x = −4d
√
tN
Nt
, and substitute it in (17) for
k. We have
ln
rk,w0
rk,w1
= x(u1 − u0) + o(1) < − ln 20,
which simplifies to
x <
− ln 20
u1 − u0 + o(1) ≤
− ln 20
0.505
+ o(1) ≤ −5.93 + o(1).
Similarly, we have
ln
rk,w2
rk,w1
= x(u1 − u2) + o(1) < ln 10
and
x > − ln 10
u2 − u1 − o(1) ≥ −
ln 10
0.45
− o(1) ≥ −5.12− o(1).
contradiction.
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The lower bound. So (16) holds for all valid k, which means for all k such that |k− t/2| ≤ c1
√
t lnN ,
either
rk,w0
rk,w1
≥ 0.05 or rk,w2
rk,w1
≥ 10.
Let H be the set of all valid integers k. We set
S =
{
k ∈ H : rk,w0
rk,w1
≥ 0.05
}
and T = H \ S.
By (16), for any k ∈ T , we have rk,w2
rk,w1
≥ 10.
Since pw1 =
∑
k∈S
qk · rk,w1 +
∑
k∈T
qk · rk,w1 ≥
0.89
N
(recall we have set all qk’s to zero for k /∈ H), we
must have either
∑
k∈S
qk · rk,w1 ≥
0.445
N
or
∑
k∈T
qk · rk,w1 ≥
0.445
N
.
If
∑
k∈S
qk · rk,w1 ≥
0.445
N
, we have
pw0 ≥
∑
k∈S
qk · rk,w1 ·
rk,w0
rk,w1
≥ 0.445
N
· 0.05 ≥ 0.022
N
,
which contradicts the constraint that pw0 ≤
0.02
N
. Otherwise,
∑
k∈T
qk · rk,w1 ≥
0.445
N
; then
pw2 ≥
∑
k∈T
qk · rk,w1 ·
rk,w2
rk,w1
≥ 0.445
N
· 10 ≥ 4.45
N
,
which violates the requirement that pw2 ≤
4.01
N
.
Since both cases lead to a contradiction, A needs to make Ω(N) queries and this completes the proof.
7 Quantum Supremacy Relative to Efficiently-Computable Oracles
We now discuss our results about quantum supremacy relative to oracles in P/poly.
Building on work by Zhandry [Zha12] and Servedio and Gortler [SG04], we first show that, if (classical)
one-way functions exist, then there exists an oracle O ∈ P/poly such that BPPO 6= BQPO. Then we make
a connection to the previous section by showing that, assuming the existence of (classical) subexponentially
strong one-way functions, Fourier Fishing and Fourier Sampling are hard even when it is promised that
the oracle is in P/poly.
We also study several other complexity questions relative to P/poly oracles: for example, P vs NP, P
vs BPP, and BQP vs SZK. Since these questions are not connected directly with quantum supremacy, we
will discuss them in Appendix A.
7.1 Preliminaries
Recall that an oracleO : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1} is itself a language, so we say that an oracleO is in P/poly when
the corresponding language belongs to P/poly, and we use On to denote its restriction to {0, 1}n.
Given two sets X and Y , we define YX as the set of functions f : X → Y . For a set X , we will
sometimes abuse notation and write X to denote the uniform distribution on X .
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(Quantum) Pseudorandom Functions and Permutations
We are going to use pseudorandom functions and permutations throughout this section, so we first review
their definitions.
Definition 7.1 (PRF and PRP). A pesudorandom function is a function PRF : K × X → Y , where K is
the key-space, and X and Y are the domain and the range. K,X ,Y are implicitly functions of the security
parameter n.12 We write y = PRFk(x).
Similarly, a pesudorandom permutation is a function PRP : K × X → X , where K is the key-space,
and X is the domain of the permutation. K and X are implicitly functions of the security parameter n. We
write y = PRPk(x). It is guaranteed that PRPk is a permutation on X for each k ∈ K.
For simplicity, we use PRFK to denote the distribution on functions f : X → Y by drawing k ← K and
set f := PRFk.
We now introduce the definitions of classical and quantum security.
Definition 7.2 (Classical-Security). A pseudorandom function PRF : K × X → Y is (classically) secure
if no classical adversary A can distinguish between a truly random function and the function PRFk for a
random k in polynomial time. That is, for every such A, there exists a negligible function ε = ε(n) such that∣∣∣∣ Prk←K[APRFk() = 1]− Prf←YX [Af () = 1]
∣∣∣∣ < ε.
Also, we say that a pseudorandom function PRF is exponentially-secure, if the above holds even for classical
adversaries that take 2O(n) time.
Similarly, a pseudorandom permutation PRP is (classically) secure if no classical adversary A can
distinguish between a truly random permutation and the function PRPk for a random k in polynomial time.
Sometimes, especially in the context of one-way functions, we will talk about subexponential security.
By this we simply mean that there is no adversary running in 2n
o(1)
time.
Definition 7.3 (Quantum-Security). A pseudorandom function PRF is quantum-secure if no quantum ad-
versary A making quantum queries can distinguish between a truly random function and the function PRFk
for a random k in polynomial time.
Also, a pseudorandom permutation PRP is quantum-secure if no quantum adversaryAmaking quantum
queries can distinguish between a truly random permutation and the function PRPk for a random k in
polynomial time.
On the Existence of PRFs
It is well-known that the existence of one-way functions implies the existence of PRFs and PRPs.
Lemma 7.4 ([HILL99, GGM86, GL89, LR88]). If one-way functions exist, then there exist secure PRFs and
PRPs. Similarly, if subexponentially-secure one-way functions exist, then there exist exponentially-secure
PRFs.
We remark here that these are all purely classical assumptions, which make no reference to quantum
algorithms. Also, the latter assumption is the same one as in the famous natural proofs barrier [RR97].
12We denote them by Kn,Xn,Yn when we need to be clear about the security parameter n.
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7.2 A Construction from Zhandry [Zha12]
To prove our separations, we will use a construction from Zhandry [Zha12] with some modifications. We
first construct a PRP and a PRF, and summarize some of their useful properties.
Definitions of PRPraw and PRFmod
Assuming one-way functions exist, by Lemma 7.4, let PRPraw be a secure pesudorandom permutation with
key-space Kraw and domain X raw. We interpret X raw as [N ], where N = N(n) = |X raw|.
Then we define another pseudorandom function PRFmod(k,a)(x) = PRP
raw
k ((x− 1) mod a+ 1) where:
• The key space of PRFmod is Kmod = Kraw ×A where A is the set of primes in [
√
N/4,
√
N/2].
• The domain and image are both X raw, that is, Xmod = X raw and Ymod = X raw.
Note that we denote the latter one by PRFmod (not PRPmod) because it is no longer a PRP.
Properties of PRPraw and PRFmod
We now summarize several properties of PRPraw and PRFmod, which can be proved along the same lines as
[Zha12].
Lemma 7.5 (Implicit in Claim 1 and Claim 2 of [Zha12]). The following statements hold when PRPraw is
classical secure.
1. Both PRPraw and PRFmod are classical secure PRFs. Consequently, no classical algorithm A can
distinguish them with a non-negligible advantage.
2. Given oracle access to PRFmod(k,a) where (k, a)← Kmod, there is a quantum algorithm that can recover
a with probability at least 1− ε.
3. There is a quantum algorithm that can distinguish PRPraw from PRFmod with advantage 1− ε.
Here ε = ε(n) is a negligible function.
For completeness, we prove Lemma 7.5 in Appendix D, by adapting the proofs of Claims 1 and 2 in
[Zha12].
7.3 BPP vs BQP
Next we discuss whether there is an oracle O ∈ P/poly that separates BPP from BQP. We show that the
answer is yes provided that one-way functions exist.
Theorem 7.6. Assuming one-way functions exist, there exists an oracle O ∈ P/poly such that BPPO 6=
BQPO.
Proof. We are going to use PRPraw and PRFmod from Section 7.2.
The oracleO will encode the truth tables of functions f1, f2, . . . , where each fn is a function from X rawn
to X rawn . For each n, with probability 0.5 we draw fn from PRPrawKraw , that is, draw k ← Kraw and set
fn := PRP
raw
k , and with probability 0.5 we draw fn from PRF
mod
Kmod similarly. We set L to be the unary
language consisting of all 0n for which fn is drawn from PRPrawKraw .
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By Lemma 7.5, there exists a BQP machine MO that decides L correctly on all but finite many values
of n with probability 1. Since we can simply hardwire the values of n on which MO is incorrect, it follows
that L ∈ BQPO with probability 1.
On the other hand, again by Lemma 7.5, no BPP machine can distinguish PRPrawKraw and PRF
mod
Kmod with
a non-negligible advantage. So let M be a BPP machine, and let En(M) be the event that M decides
whether 0n ∈ L correctly. We have
Pr
O
[En(M)] =
1
2
+ o(1),
even conditioning on events E1(M), . . . , En−1(M). Therefore, we have PrO
[∧+∞i=1En(M)] = 0, which
means that a BPP machineM decidesLwith probability 0. Since there are countably many BPP machines,
it follows that L /∈ BPPO with probability 1. Hence BPPO 6= BQPO with probability 1.
Finally, note that each fn has a polynomial-size circuit, and consequently O ∈ P/poly.
7.4 Fourier Fishing and Fourier Sampling
Finally, we discuss Fourier Fishing and Fourier Sampling. We are going to show that, assuming the
existence of subexponentially-secure one-way functions, Fourier Fishing and Fourier Sampling are hard
even when it is promised that the oracle belongs to P/poly.
Theorem 7.7. Assuming the existence of subexponentially strong one-way functions, there is no polynomial-
time classical algorithm that can solve promise-Ffishing with probability
SuccR + Ω(1),
even when it is promised that the oracle function belongs to P/poly.
Proof. By Lemma 7.4, we can use our one-way function to construct an exponentially-secure pseudorandom
function, PRF : K × X → Y . Without loss of generality, we assume that |Y| = 2 and |X | = 2n. Then we
interpret X as the set {0, 1}n, and Y as the set {−1, 1}.
A Concentration Inequality. Now, consider the distribution PRFK on functions {0, 1}n → {−1, 1}.
We claim that
Pr
f←PRFK
[adv(f) > SuccQ − 1/n] > 1− 1
n
− o(1). (18)
To see this: from Lemma 6.5, we have
Pr
f←YX
[adv(f) > SuccQ − 1/n] > 1− 1
n
.
Therefore, if (18) does not hold, then we can construct a distinguisher between PRFK and truly ran-
dom functions XY by calculating adv(f) in 2O(n) time. But this contradicts the assumption that PRF is
exponentially-secure.
A distributional lower bound. Next, we show that for every polynomial-time algorithm A, we have
Pr
f←PRFK
[Af solves Ffishing correctly] ≤ SuccR + o(1). (19)
This is because when f is a truly random function, from Lemma 6.6, we have
Pr
f←YX
[Af solve Ffishing correctly] ≤ SuccR + o(1).
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So if (19) does not hold, then we can construct a distinguisher between PRFK and truly random functions
XY by simulating Af to get its output z, and then checking whether z is a correct solution to Ffishing in
2O(n) time. This again contradicts our assumption that PRF is exponentially-secure.
The lower bound. Finally, we prove the theorem. Suppose for contradiction that there is such a
polynomial-time algorithm A. Then when f ← PRFK, from (18), with probability 1 − 1/n − o(1), we
have that f satisfies the promise of promise-Ffishing. Thus, A solves Ffishing when f ← PRFK with
probability at least
(1− o(1)) · (SuccR + Ω(1)) = SuccR + Ω(1),
which contradicts (19).
By a similar reduction, we can show that Fourier Sampling is also hard.
Corollary 7.8. Assuming the existence of subexponentially-secure one-way functions, no polynomial-time
classical algorithm can solve Fsampling with error
ε < SuccQ − SuccR ≈ 0.483,
even if it is promised that the oracle function belongs to P/poly.
Proof. For a function f , an exact algorithm for Fsampling can be used to solve Ffishing with probability
adv(f). Hence, a polynomial-time sampling algorithm A for Fsampling with error at most ε can solve
Ffishing with probability at least adv(f)− ε.
Note that by (18), when f ← PRFK, the algorithm A can solve Ffishing with probability at least
(SuccQ − 1
n
− ε) · (1− o(1)) = SuccQ − o(1)− ε.
Therefore, by (19), we must have ε ≥ SuccQ − SuccR, which completes the proof.
8 Complexity Assumptions Are Needed for Quantum Supremacy Relative
to Efficiently-Computable Oracles
In Section 7.4, we showed that the existence of subexponentially-secure one-way functions implies that
Fourier Sampling and Fourier Fishing are classically hard, even when it is promised that the oracle
function belongs to P/poly. We also showed that if one-way functions exist, then there exists an oracle
O ∈ P/poly which separates BPP from BQP.
It is therefore natural to ask whether we can prove the same statements unconditionally. In this section,
we show that at least some complexity assumptions are needed.
Theorem 8.1. Suppose SampBPP = SampBQP and NP ⊆ BPP. Then for every oracle O ∈ P/poly,
we have SampBPPO = SampBQPO (and consequently BPPO = BQPO).
Much like in the proof of Theorem 5.1, we need to show that under the stated assumptions, every
SampBQP algorithm M can be simulated by a SampBPP algorithm A.
Lemma 8.2. Suppose SampBPP = SampBQP and NP ⊆ BPP. Then for any polynomial q(n) and any
SampBQP oracle algorithm M , there is a SampBPP oracle algorithm A such that:
For everyO ∈ SIZE(q(n)), 13 let DMx,ε and DAx,ε be the distributions output by MO and AO respectively
on input 〈x, 01/ε〉. Then
‖DMx,ε −DAx,ε‖ ≤ ε.
13A language is in SIZE(q(n)) if it can be computed by circuits of size q(n).
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Before proving Lemma 8.2, we show that it implies Theorem 8.1.
Proof of Theorem 8.1. Let O ∈ P/poly be an oracle. Then there exists a polynomial q(n) such that O ∈
SIZE(q(n)).
Let S be a sampling problem in SampBQPO. This means that there is a SampBQP oracle algorithm
M , such that for all x ∈ {0, 1}∗ and ε, we have ‖DMx,ε−Sx‖ ≤ ε. LetAM be the corresponding SampBPP
algorithm whose existence we’ve assumed, and consider the following algorithm A′: given input 〈x, 01/ε〉,
run AM on input 〈x, 02/ε〉 to get a sample from DAMx,ε/2.
Then we have
‖DA′x,ε − Sx‖ = ‖DAMx,ε/2 − Sx‖
≤ ‖DMx,ε/2 −DAMx,ε/2‖+ ‖DMx,ε/2 − Sx‖ ≤ 2 ·
ε
2
≤ ε.
This means that A′ solves S and S ∈ SampBPPO. Hence SampBQPO ⊆ SampBPPO.
Now we prove Lemma 8.2. The simulation procedure is similar to that in Lemma 5.3: that is, we replace
each oracle gate, one by one, by a known function while minimizing the introduced error. The difference
is that, instead of the brute-force method as in Lemma 5.3, here we use a more sophisticated PAC learning
subroutine to find an “approximator” to replace the oracle gates.
Proof of Lemma 8.2. Let O ∈ SIZE(q(n)); we let fn = On for simplicity.
Recall that there exists a fixed polynomial p, such that given input 〈x, 01/ε〉, the machine M first con-
structs a quantum circuit C with N = p(|x|, 1/ε) qubits and N gates classically (C can contain O gates).
Without loss of generality, we can assume for each n, all fn gates act only on the first n qubits.
For a function f : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}, recall that Uf denotes the unitary operator mapping |i〉 to
(−1)f(i)|i〉 for i ∈ {0, 1}k.
Suppose there are T O-gates in total, and the i-th O-gate is an fni gate. Then the unitary operator U
applied by the circuit C can be decomposed as
U = UT+1(UfnT ⊗ IN−nT ) · · · (Ufn2 ⊗ IN−n2)U2(Ufn1 ⊗ IN−n1)U1,
where the Ui’s are the unitary operators corresponding to the sub-circuits which don’t contain an O-gate.
Again, the algorithm proceeds by replacing each O-gate by a much simpler gate one by one, without
affecting the resulting quantum state too much, and then simulating the final circuit to get a sample to output.
Replacing the t-th O-gate. Suppose we have already replaced the first t − 1 O-gates: that is, for each
i ∈ [t− 1], we replaced the fni gate (the i-th O-gate) with a gi gate. Now we are going to replace the t-th
O-gate.
Let
|v〉 = Ut(Ugt−1 ⊗ IN−nt−1) · · · (Ug2 ⊗ IN−n2)U2(Ug1 ⊗ IN−n1)U1|0〉⊗N ,
which is the quantum state right before the t-th O gate in the circuit after the replacement.
For brevity, we use f to denote the function fnt , and we drop the subscript t of nt when it is clear from
context.
Analysis of incurred error. The t-thO-gate is an f gate. If we replace it by a g gate, then the deviation
caused to the quantum states is
‖Uf ⊗ IN−n|v〉 − Ug ⊗ IN−n|v〉‖ = ‖(Uf − Ug)⊗ IN−n|v〉‖.
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Let H be the Hilbert space corresponding to the last N − n qubits, and let ρ = TrH [|v〉〈v|]. Then
proceeding exactly as in Lemma 5.3, we have
‖((Uf − Ug)⊗ IN−n)|v〉‖2 = 4 · Pr
i∼Q
[f(i) 6= g(i)], (20)
where Q is the probability on {0, 1}n defined by Q(i) = 〈i|ρ|i〉, and [f(i) 6= g(i)] is the indicator function
that takes value 1 when f(i) 6= g(i) and 0 otherwise.
Upper bounding the deviation (20) vis PAC learning. Now, we want to replace f by another function
g, so that the deviation term (20) is minimized.
By a standard result of PAC learning (cf. the book of Vapnik [Vap98]), for parameters ε1 and δ1, we can
take a poly(n, ε−11 , ln δ
−1
1 ) number of i.i.d. samples fromQ, and then find a function g in SIZE(q(n)) which
agrees with f on those samples. Then with probability at least 1− δ1, we will have
Pr
i∼Q
[f(i) 6= g(i)] ≤ ε1.
The choice of ε1 and δ1 will be made later. In any case, with probability at least 1− δ1, we have
‖(Uf − Ug)⊗ IN−n|v〉‖2 ≤ 4ε1,
which in turn implies
‖(Uf − Ug)⊗ IN−n|v〉‖ ≤ 2 · √ε1.
Analysis of the final circuit Cfinal. Suppose that at the end, for each t ∈ [T ], our algorithm has replaced
the t-th O-gate with a gt gate, where gt is a function from {0, 1}nt to {0, 1}. Let Cfinal be the circuit after
the replacement. Also, let
V = UT+1(UgT ⊗ IN−nT ) · · · (Ug2 ⊗ IN−n2)U2(Ug1 ⊗ IN−n1)U1
be the unitary operator corresponding to Cfinal.
Now we set δ1 =
ε
2T
, and ε1 =
ε4
256T 2
. Then by a union bound over all rounds, and following exactly
the same analysis as in Lemma 5.3, with probability at least 1− T · δ1 = 1− ε/2, we have
‖U |0〉⊗N − V |0〉⊗N‖ ≤ 2T · √ε1 = ε
2
8
.
Our classical algorithm A then simulates stages 2 and 3 of the SampBQP algorithm M straightfor-
wardly. It first takes a sample z by measuring V |0〉⊗N in the computational basis, and then outputs
Aoutput(z) as its sample, where Aoutput is the classical algorithm used by M in stage 3.
By Corollary 2.5, with probability at least 1 − ε/2, the final distribution D on which A takes samples
satisfies
‖D − DMx,ε‖ ≤
√
2 · ε
2
8
=
ε
2
.
Hence, the outputted distribution DAx,ε satisfies
‖DAx,ε −DMx,ε‖ ≤ ε.
Showing that A is a SampBPP algorithm. We still have to show that A is a SampBPP oracle
algorithm. From the previous discussion, A needs to do the following non-trivial computations.
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• Taking a polynomial number of samples from Q. This task is in SampBQP (no oracle involved) by
definition. By our assumption SampBQP = SampBPP, it can be done in SampBPP.
• Finding a g ∈ SIZE(q(n)) such that g agrees with f on all the samples. This can be done in NP, so
by our assumption NP ⊆ BPP, it can be done in BPP.
• Taking a sample by measuring V |0〉⊗N . Again, this task is in SampBQP, and hence can be done in
SampBPP by our assumption.
Therefore, A is a SampBPP oracle algorithm.
9 Open Problems
There are many exciting open problems left by this paper; here we mention just a few.
(1) Is QUATH (our assumption about the hardness of guessing whether |〈0|C|0〉|2 is greater or less than
the median) true or false?
(2) Is Conjecture 1 true? That is, does a random quantum circuit on n qubits sample an unbalanced
distribution over n-bit strings with 1− 1/ exp(n) probability?
(3) We showed that there exists an oracle relative to which SampBPP = SampBQP but PH is infinite.
Can we nevertheless show that SampBPP = SampBQP would collapse PH in the unrelativized
world? (An affirmative answer would, of course, follow from Aaronson and Arkhipov’s Permanent-
of-Gaussians Conjecture [AA13], as mentioned in Section 1.2.)
(4) Is our classical algorithm to simulate a quantum circuit with n qubits and m gates optimal? Or
could we reduce the complexity, say from mO(n) to 2O(n) · mO(1), while keeping the space usage
polynomial? Does it matter if we only want to sample from the output distribution, rather than
actually calculating the probabilities? What about if we only want to guess an amplitude with small
bias, as would be needed to refute QUATH?
(5) For random quantum circuit sampling, we proved a conditional hardness result that talks directly
about the observed outputs of a sampling process, rather than about the unknown distribution that’s
sampled from. Can we get analogous hardness results for the BosonSampling or IQP models, under
some plausible hardness conjecture? Note that the argument from Section 3 doesn’t work directly
for BosonSampling or IQP, for the simple reason that in those models, the advantage over chance
in guessing a given amplitude is at least 1/ exp(n), rather than 1/ exp(m) for some m  n as is the
case for random circuits.
(6) We proved a lower bound of Ω(N) on the classical query complexity of Fourier Sampling, for a
rather small error ε =
1
40000
. The error constant does matter for sampling problems, since there is
no efficient way to reduce the error in general. So can we discover the exact threshold ε for an Ω(N)
lower bound? That is, find the constant ε such that there is an o(N) query classical algorithm solving
Fourier Sampling with error ε, but any classical algorithm with error < ε needs Ω(N) queries?
(7) In Section 7, we showed that there is an oracle O in P/poly separating BPP from BQP, assuming
that one-way functions exist. Is it possible to weaken the assumption to, say, NP 6⊂ BPP?
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A Other Results on Oracle Separations in P/poly
In this section we discuss the rest of our results on complexity theory relative to oracles in P/poly (see
Figure 1 for an overview). For the definitions of the involved complexity classes, see for example [A+].
We first discuss P and NP. We observe that there exists an oracle O ∈ P/poly such that PO 6= NPO
unconditionally, and no oracle O ∈ P/poly can make P = NP unless NP ⊂ P/poly.
Then we discuss P and BPP. We first prove that the standard derandomization assumption (there exists
a function f ∈ E = DTIME(2O(n)) that requires a 2Ω(n)-size circuit) also implies that PO = BPPO for all
O ∈ P/poly. Then, surprisingly, we show that the converse also holds! I.e., if no such f exists, then there
exists an oracle O ∈ P/poly such that PO 6= BPPO.
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Finally, we discuss BQP and SZK. We show that assuming the existence of one-way functions, there
exist oracles in P/poly that separate BQP from SZK, and also SZK from BQP.
We will need to use quantum-secure pseudorandom permutations. By a very recent result of Zhandry [Zha16],
their existence follows from the existence of quantum one-way functions.
Lemma A.1 ( [Zha16]). Assuming quantum one way functions exist, there exist quantum-secure PRPs.
P
BPP
BQP
SZKNP
SampBPP SampBQP
Figure 1: C1 → C2 indicates C1 is contained in C2 respect to every oracle in P/poly, and C1 99K C2 denotes
that there is an oracleO ∈ P/poly such that CO1 6⊂ CO2 . Red indicates this statement is based on the existence
of classical one-way functions, Blue indicates the statement is based on the existence of quantum one-way
functions, and Black indicates the statement holds unconditionally.
A.1 P, BPP, BQP vs NP
We begin with the relationships of P, BPP, and BQP to NP relative to oracles in P/poly.
The first observation is that using the function OR and standard diagonalization techniques, together
with the fact that OR is hard for quantum algorithms [BBBV97], we immediately have:
Observation 1. There is an oracle O ∈ P/poly such that NPO 6⊂ BQPO.
On the other side, we also show that unless NP ⊂ P/poly (BQP/poly), there is no oracle O ∈ P/poly
such that NPO ⊆ BPPO (BQPO).
Theorem A.2. Unless NP ⊂ P/poly, there is no oracle O ∈ P/poly such that NPO ⊆ BPPO. Likewise,
there is no oracle O ∈ P/poly such that NPO ⊆ BQPO unless NP ⊆ BQP/poly.
Proof. Suppose there is an oracle O ∈ P/poly such that NPO ⊆ BPPO. Since BPP ⊂ P/poly, and
PO/poly ⊆ P/poly (since the relevant parts of the oracleO can be directly supplied to the P/poly algorithm),
we have NP ⊆ NPO ⊂ P/poly. The second claim can be proved in the same way.
The following corollary is immediate.
Corollary A.3. There is an oracle O ∈ P/poly such that PO 6= NPO, and there is no oracle O ∈ P/poly
such that PO = NPO unless NP ⊂ P/poly.
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A.2 P vs BPP
Next we consider the relationship between P and BPP. It is not hard to observe that the standard deran-
domization assumption for P = BPP is in fact strong enough to make PO = BPPO for every oracle O in
P/poly.
Given a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, letHwrs(f) be the minimum size of circuits computing f exactly.
Observation 2 (Implicit in [NW94, IW97], see also Theorem 20.7 in [AB09]). If there exists a function
f ∈ E = DTIME(2O(n)) and ε > 0 such that Hwrs(f) ≥ 2εn for sufficiently large n, then BPPO = PO for
every O ∈ P/poly.
Proof Sketch. From [NW94] and [IW97], the assumption leads to a strong PRG which is able to fool circuits
of a fixed polynomial size with a logarithmic seed length.
An algorithm with an oracle O ∈ P/poly with a certain input can still be represented by a polynomial
size circuit, so we can still enumerate all possible seeds to get a deterministic algorithm.
Surprisingly, we show that condition is not only sufficient, but also necessary.
Theorem A.4. If for every f ∈ E = DTIME(2O(n)) and ε > 0, there are infinitely many n’s withHwrs(f) <
2εn, then there exists an oracle O ∈ P/poly such that BPPO 6= PO.
Proof. For simplicity, in the following we will specify an oracle O by a sequence of functions {fi}, where
each fi is a function from {0, 1}ni → {0, 1} and the sequence {ni} is strictly increasing. That is, Oni is
set to fi, and O maps all strings with length not in {ni} to 0.
As there are only countably many P oracle TM machines, we let {Ai}+∞i=1 be an ordering of them.
The GapMaj function. Recall that the gapped-majority function, GapMaj : {0, 1}N → {0, 1}, which
outputs 1 if the input has Hamming weight ≥ 2N/3, or 0 if the input has Hamming weight ≤ N/3, and is
undefined otherwise, is the function which separates P and BPP in the query complexity world. We are
going to encode inputs to GapMaj in the oracle bits to achieve our separation.
We call an oracle valid, if for each n, either |O−1n (0)| ≥
2
3
· 2n or |O−1n (1)| ≥
2
3
· 2n. That is, if we
interpret On as a binary string with length 2n, then GapMaj(On) is defined.
The language LO. For a valid oracle O, we define the following language:
LO = {0n : GapMaj(On) = 1}.
Clearly, this language lies in BPPO. To prove the theorem, we will construct a valid oracle O such that
LO 6∈ PO.
Construction of O. To construct such an oracle, we resort to the standard diagonalization method:
for each integer i, we find an integer ni and set the function Oni so that the machine Ai can’t decide 0ni
correctly. In order to do this, we will make sure that each Ai can only see 0 when querying the function
Oni . Since Ai can only see a polynomial number of bits, we can set the remaining bits inOni adversarially.
Let Oipart be the oracle specified by {Onj}ij=1, and let Ti be the maximum integer such that a bit in OTi
is queried by Ai when running on input 0ni . Observe that by setting ni+1 > Ti, we can make sure that
AOi (0
ni) = A
Oipart
i (0
ni) for each i.
Diagonalization against Ai. Suppose we have already constructed On1 , . . . ,Oni−1 , and we are going
to deal with Ai. Since Ai is a P machine, there exists a constant c such that Ai runs in at most nc steps for
inputs with length n. Thus, Ai can query at most nc values in On on input 0n.
Construction and Analysis of f . Now consider the following function f , which analyzes the behavior
of A
Oi−1part
i :
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• given an input x ∈ {0, 1}∗, let m = |x|;
• the first m1 = bm/5cc bits of x encode an integer n ∈ [2m1 ];
• the next m2 = m−m1 bits of x encode a string p ∈ {0, 1}m2 ;
• f(x) = 1 iff AO
i−1
part
i (0
n) has queried On(z) for an z ∈ {0, 1}n with p as a prefix.14
It is not hard to see that f ∈ E: the straightforward algorithm which directly simulates AO
i−1
part
i (0
n)
runs in O(nc) = 2O(m/5c·c) = 2O(m) time (note that the input length is m = |x|). Therefore, by our
assumption, there exists an integer m such that 2bm/5cc > max(Ti−1, ni−1) and Hwrs(fm) < 2m/c. Then
we set ni = 2bm/5cc.
Construction and Analysis of Oni . Now, if A
Oi−1part
i (0
ni) = 1 , we set Oni to be the constant function
0, so that LO(0ni) = 0.
Otherwise, A
Oi−1part
i (0
ni) = 0. We define a function g : {0, 1}ni → {0, 1} as follows: g(z) = 1 iff
A
Oi−1part
i (0
ni) has queriedOni(z′) for an z′ ∈ {0, 1}ni such that z and z′ share a prefix of lengthm−bm/5cc.
Note that g(z) can be implemented by hardwiring ni and z1...m−bm/5cc (that is, the first m−bm/5cc bits of
z) into the circuit for fm, which means that there is a circuit of size 2m/c = n
O(1)
i for g. We setOni := ¬g.
From the definition of g and the fact that A
Oi−1part
i (0
ni) makes at most nci queries, there is at most a
nci
2m−bm/5cc
<
nci
24cbm/5cc
= n−3ci
fraction of inputs that are 0 in ¬g. Hence, GapMaj(¬g) = 1 and LO(0ni) = 1.
We claim that in both cases, we have A
Oi−1part
i (0
ni) = A
Oipart
i (0
ni). This holds trivially in the first case
since we set Oni := 0. For the second case, note from the definition of g that all queries by A
Oipart
i (0
ni) to
Oni return 0, and hence Ai will behave exactly the same.
Finally, since we set ni > Ti−1 for each i, we have AOi (0
ni) = A
Oipart
i (0
ni) 6= LO(0ni), which means
that no Ai can decide LO.
A.3 BQP vs SZK
Next we investigate the relationship between BQP and SZK relative to oracles in P/poly. We first show
that, by using quantumly-secure pseudorandom permutations, as well as the quantum lower bound for distin-
guishing permutations from 2-to-1 functions [AS04], we can construct an oracle in P/poly which separates
SZK from BQP.
Theorem A.5. Assuming quantum-secure one way functions exist, there exists an oracle O ∈ P/poly such
that SZKO 6⊂ BQPO.
Proof. Let PRP be a quantum-secure pseudorandom permutation from K × X → X , whose existence is
guaranteed by Lemma A.1.
We first build a pseudorandom 2-to-1 function from PRP. We interpret X as [N ] where N = |X |, and
assume that N is even. We construct PRF2→1 : (K ×K)×X → X as follows:
14For simplicity, we still use On to denote the restriction of Oi−1part on {0, 1}n.
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• The key space K2→1 is K ×K. That is, a key k ∈ K2→1 is a pair of keys (k1, k2).
• PRF2→1(k1,k2)(x) := PRPk2((PRPk1(x) mod N/2) + 1).
Note that PRF2→1 would be a uniformly random 2-to-1 function from [N ]→ [N ], if PRPk1 and PRPk2
were replaced by two uniformly random permutations on [N ]. Hence, by a standard reduction argument,
PRF2→1 is a quantumly-secure pseudorandom 2-to-1 function. That is, for any polynomial-time quantum
algorithm A, we have ∣∣∣∣∣ Prk←K2→1[APRF2→1k () = 1]− Prf←F2→1X [Af () = 1]
∣∣∣∣∣ < ε,
where ε is a negligible function and F2→1X is the set of 2-to-1 functions from X → X .
Also, from the definition of PRP, we have∣∣∣∣ Pr
k←KPRP
[APRPk() = 1]− Pr
f←PermX
[Af () = 1]
∣∣∣∣ < ε,
where PermX is the set of permutations on X .
From the results of Aaronson and Shi [AS04], Ambainis [Amb05] and Kutin [Kut05], no o(N1/3)-query
quantum algorithm can distinguish a random permutation from a random 2-to-1 function. Therefore, we
have ∣∣∣∣∣ Prf←F2→1X [Af () = 1]− Prf←PermX [Af () = 1]
∣∣∣∣∣ < o(1).
Putting the above three inequalities together, we have∣∣∣∣ Pr
k←K2→1
[APRF
2→1
k () = 1]− Pr
k←KPRP
[APRPk() = 1]
∣∣∣∣ < o(1),
which means A cannot distinguish PRF2→1K2→1 and PRPKPRP .
On the other side, an SZK algorithm can easily distinguish a permutation from a two-to-one function.
Therefore, we can proceed exactly as in Theorem 7.6 to construct an oracle O ∈ P/poly such that SZKO 6⊂
BQPO.
Very recently, Chen [Che16] showed that, based on a construction similar to the “cheat-sheet” function
by Aaronson, Ben-David and Kothari [ABDK15], we can take any function which is hard for BPP algo-
rithms, and turn it into a function which is hard for SZK algorithms in a black-box fashion. We are going to
adapt this construction, together with a PRF, to build an oracle in P/poly which separates BQP from SZK.
Theorem A.6. Assuming one-way functions exist, there exists an oracle O ∈ P/poly such that BQPO 6⊂
SZKO.
Proof. We will use the PRFmod : Kmod × Xmod → Xmod defined in Section 7.2 here. For simplicity, we
will use X to denote Xmod in this proof. Recall that X is interpreted as [N ] for N = N(n) = |X |.
Construction of distributions Din. For each n, we define distributions D0n and D1n on (Xn → Xn) ×
{0, 1}
√
N/2 as follows. We draw a function fn : X → X from PRFmodKmod , that is, we draw (k, a)← Kmod =
Kraw × A, and set fn := PRFmod(k,a); then we let z = 0
√
N/2 first, and set za = i in Din; finally we output the
pair (f, z) as a sample.
Distinguishing D0n and D1n is hard for SZK. Recall that SZK is a semantic class. That is, a given
protocol Π might be invalid with different oracles or different inputs (i.e., the protocol might not satisfy the
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zero-knowledge constraint, or the verifier might accept with a probability that is neither ≥ 2/3 nor ≤ 1/3).
We write Π(f,z)() = ⊥ when Π is invalid given oracle access to (f, z).
We claim that for any protocol Π, one of the following two claims must hold for sufficiently large n:
(A) Pr
(f,z)←D0n
[
Π(f,z)() = ⊥
]
> 0.1 or Pr
(f,z)←D1n
[
Π(f,z)() = ⊥
]
> 0.1.
(B)
∣∣∣∣ Pr
(f,z)←D0n
[
Π(f,z)() = 1
]
− Pr
(f,z)←D1n
[
Π(f,z)() = 1
]∣∣∣∣ < 0.2.
That is, either Π is invalid on a large fraction of oracles, or else Π cannot distinguish D0n from D1n with
a very good probability.
Building aBPP algorithm to break PRFmod. Suppose for a contradiction that there are infinitely many
n such that none of (A) and (B) hold. Without loss of generality, we can assume that
Pr
(f,z)←D1n
[
Π(f,z)() = 1
]
− Pr
(f,z)←D0n
[
Π(f,z)() = 1
]
≥ 0.2.
We are going to build a BPP algorithm which is able to break PRFmod on those n, thereby contradicting
Lemma 7.5.
From (A), we have
Pr
(f,z)←D1n
[
Π(f,z)() = 1
]
−
(
1− Pr
(f,z)←D0n
[
Π(f,z)() = 0
])
≥ 0.1,
which simplifies to
Pr
(f,z)←D1n
[
Π(f,z)() = 1
]
+ Pr
(f,z)←D0n
[
Π(f,z)() = 0
]
≥ 1.1.
From the definition of D0n and D1n, the above implies that
Pr
(k,a)←Kmod
[
Π(f,z1)() = 1 and Π(f,z0)() = 0, f = PRFmod(k,a), z0 = 0
√
N/2, z1 = ea
]
≥ 0.1,
where ea denotes the string of length
√
N/2 that is all zero except for the a-th bit.
Analysis of distributions A(f,z)i . By a result of Sahai and Vadhan [SV03], there are two polynomial-
time samplable distributions A(f,z)0 and A
(f,z)
1 such that ‖A(f,z)0 − A(f,z)1 ‖ ≥ 1 − 2−n when Π(f,z)() = 1;
and ‖A(f,z)0 −A(f,z)1 ‖ ≤ 2−n when Π(f,z)() = 0.
Hence, with probability 0.1 over (k, a)← Kmod, we have
‖A(f,z1)0 −A(f,z1)1 ‖ ≥ 1− 2−n and ‖A(f,z0)0 −A(f,z0)1 ‖ ≤ 2−n.
This means that either ‖A(f,z0)0 −A(f,z1)0 ‖ ≥ 1/3 or ‖A(f,z0)1 −A(f,z1)1 ‖ ≥ 1/3.
Now we show that the above implies an algorithm that breaks PRFmod, and therefore contradicts
Lemma 7.5.
The algorithm and its analysis. Given oracle access to a function f ← PRFmodKmod , our algorithm first
picks a random index i ∈ {0, 1}. It then simulates Ai with oracle access to (f, z) to take a sample from
A
(f,z)
i , where z = z0 = 0
√
N/2; it records all the indices in z that are queried by Ai. Now, with probability
at least 0.1/2 = 0.05, we have ‖A(f,z0)i − A(f,z1)i ‖ ≥ 1/3. Since (f, z0) and (f, z1) only differ at the a-th
index of z, we can see that A(f,z0)i must have queried the a-th index of z with probability at least 1/3.
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Hence, with probability at least 0.05/3 = Ω(1), one of the values recorded by our algorithm is a, and
in that case our algorithm can find a collision in f easily. However, when f is a truly random function, no
algorithm can find a collision with a non-negligible probability. Therefore, this algorithm is a distinguisher
between PRFmod and a truly random function, contradicting the fact that PRFmod is secure by Lemma 7.5.
Construction of the oracle O. Finally, we are ready to construct our oracle O. We will let O encode
pairs (f1, z1), (f2, z2), . . . , where fn is a function from Xn to Xn and zn ∈ {0, 1}
√
N/2.
For each n, we draw a random index i ← {0, 1}, and then draw (fn, zn) ← Din. We set L to be the
unary language consisting of all 0n for which (fn, zn) is drawn from D1n.
From Lemma 7.5, a quantum algorithm can distinguish D0n from D1n, except with negligible probability,
by recovering a. Therefore, by a similar argument as in the proof of Theorem 7.6, we have L ∈ BQPO
with probability 1.
On the other hand, for a protocol Π and a sufficiently large n, either (A) happens, which means that
Π(fn,zn) is invalid with probability 0.05 on input 0n, or (B) happens, which means that Π cannot distinguish
D0n and D1n with a constant probability.
In both cases Π cannot decide whether 0n belongs to L correctly with bounded error. Hence, again by a
similar argument as in the proof of Theorem 7.6, the probability that Π decides L is 0. And since there are
only countably many protocols, we have L /∈ SZKO with probability 1, which means that BQPO 6⊂ SZKO
with probability 1.
Finally, it is easy to see that O ∈ P/poly, which completes the proof.
B Missing Proofs in Section 3
We first prove Lemma 3.6.
Proof of Lemma 3.6. Let N = 2n for simplicity and L be a list consisting of N reals: |〈u|w〉|2 − 2−n for
each w ∈ {0, 1}n. We sort all reals in L in increasing order, and denote them by a1, a2, . . . , aN . We also
let ∆ = dev(|u〉) for brevity.
Then from the definitions of adv(|u〉) and dev(|u〉), we have
N∑
i=1
ai = 0,
N∑
i=1
|ai| = ∆,
and
adv(|u〉) = 1
2
+
N∑
i=N/2+1
ai.
Now, let t be the first index such that at ≥ 0. Then we have
N∑
i=t
ai =
N∑
i=t
|ai| = ∆
2
and
t−1∑
i=1
ai = −
t−1∑
i=1
|ai| = −∆
2
.
We are going to consider the following two cases.
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• (i): t ≥ N/2 + 1. Note that ai’s are increasing and for all i < t, ai < 0, we have
N/2∑
i=1
|ai| ≥
t−1∑
i=N/2+1
|ai|,
which means
t−1∑
i=N/2+1
|ai| ≤ 1
2
·
t−1∑
i=1
|ai| ≤ ∆
4
.
Therefore,
N∑
i=N/2+1
ai ≥
N∑
i=t
ai +
t−1∑
i=N/2+1
ai ≥ 1
2
+
∆
2
− ∆
4
≥ 1
2
+
∆
4
.
• (ii): t ≤ N/2. In this case, note that we have
N∑
i=N/2+1
ai ≥
N/2∑
i=t
ai.
Therefore,
N∑
i=N/2+1
ai ≥ 1
2
·
N∑
i=t
ai ≥ ∆
4
.
Since in both cases we have
N∑
i=N/2+1
ai ≥ ∆
4
, it follows that
adv(|u〉) = 1
2
+
N∑
i=N/2+1
ai ≥ 1
2
+
∆
4
,
which completes the proof.
Now we prove Lemma 3.7.
Proof of Lemma 3.7. The random pure state |u〉 can be generated as follows: draw four i.i.d. reals x1, x2, x3, x4 ∼
N (0, 1), and set
|u〉 = (x1 + x2i)|0〉+ (x3 + x4i)|1〉√
x21 + x
2
2 + x
2
3 + x
2
4
.
Hence, we have
E
[∣∣∣|〈u|0〉|2 − |〈u|1〉|2∣∣∣] =∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
1
(2pi)2
|x21 + x22 − x23 − x24|
x21 + x
2
2 + x
2
3 + x
2
4
· e−(x21+x22+x23+x24)/2dx1dx2dx3dx4
=
∫ 2pi
0
∫ 2pi
0
∫ +∞
0
∫ +∞
0
1
(2pi)2
· |ρ
2
1 − ρ22|
ρ21 + ρ
2
2
· ρ1ρ2 · e−(ρ21+ρ22)/2dρ1dρ2dθ1dθ2
(x1 = ρ1 sin θ1, y1 = ρ1 cos θ1, x2 = ρ2 sin θ2, y2 = ρ2 cos θ2)
=
∫ +∞
0
∫ +∞
0
|ρ21 − ρ22|
ρ21 + ρ
2
2
· ρ1ρ2 · e−(ρ21+ρ22)/2dρ1dρ2
=
1
2
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C Missing Proofs in Section 6
We prove Lemma 6.5 here.
Proof of Lemma 6.5. We prove the concentration inequality by bounding the variance,
Var[adv(f)] = E[adv(f)2]− E[adv(f)]2.
Note that
E[adv(f)]2 =
(
2√
2pi
∫ +∞
1
x2e−x
2/2dx
)2
= Succ2Q.
We now calculate E[adv(f)2]. We have
E
f
[adv(f)2] = E
f
[(
E
z∈{0,1}n
[f̂2(z) · 1|f̂(z)|≥1]
)2]
= E
f
[
E
z1,z2∈{0,1}n
[
f̂2(z1)f̂
2(z2) · 1|f̂(z1)|≥1∧|f̂(z2)|≥1
]]
.
= E
z1,z2∈{0,1}n
[
E
f
[
f̂2(z1)f̂
2(z2) · 1|f̂(z1)|≥1∧|f̂(z2)|≥1
]]
.
Now there are two cases: z1 = z2 and z1 6= z2. When z1 = z2, let z = z1 = z2; then we have
Exf
[
f̂2(z1)f̂
2(z2) · 1|f̂(z1)|≥1∧|f̂(z2)|≥1
]
=E
f
[
f̂4(z) · 1|f̂(z)|≥1
]
=
2√
2pi
∫ +∞
1
x4e−x
2/2dx
=O(1).
Next, if z1 6= z2, then without loss of generality, we can assume z1 = 0N . Now we define two sets A
and B,
A = {x ∈ {0, 1}n : (z2 · x) = 0} and B = {x ∈ {0, 1}n : (z2 · x) = 1}.
We also define
f̂A :=
1√
N/2
·
∑
z∈A
f(z) and f̂B :=
1√
N/2
·
∑
z∈B
f(z).
Then from the definitions of f̂(z1) and f̂(z2), we have
f̂(z1) =
1√
2
· (f̂A + f̂B) and f̂(z1) = 1√
2
· (f̂A − f̂B).
Therefore,
E
f
[
f̂2(z1)f̂
2(z2) · 1|f̂(z1)|≥1∧|f̂(z2)|≥1
]
=
(
1√
2pi
)2
·
∫
|a+b|≥√2
|a−b|≥√2
1
4
· (a+ b)2 · (a− b)2 · e−(a2+b2)/2 · dadb.
Let x = a+ b and y = a− b. Then
a =
x+ y
2
, b =
x− y
2
, da =
dx+ dy
2
, and db =
dx− dy
2
.
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Also note that x2 + y2 = 2(a2 + b2). Plugging in x and y, the above can be simplified to
1
2pi
∫
|x|≥√2
|y|≥√2
1
4
x2y2e−(x
2+y2)/4 · 1
2
dxdy =
1
2pi
(∫
|x|≥√2
1
2
√
2
· x2e−x2/4dx
)2
=
1
2pi
(∫ +∞
√
2
1√
2
· x2e−x2/4dx
)2
=
1
2pi
(∫ +∞
1
2t2e−t
2/2dt
)2
(t = x/
√
2)
=
(
2√
2pi
∫ +∞
1
t2e−t
2/2dt
)2
= Succ2Q.
Putting two cases together, we have
E
f
[adv(f)2] =
1
N
·O(1) + N − 1
N
· Succ2Q,
which in turn implies
Var[adv(f)] = O(1/N).
D Missing Proofs in Section 7
For completeness, we prove Lemma 7.5 here.
Proof of Lemma 7.5. In the following, we will always use ε = ε(n) to denote a negligible function. And
we will denote X raw as X for brevity. Recall that we interpret X as [N ] for N = N(n) = X .
Both PRPraw and PRFmod are classically-secure PRFs. It is well-known that a secure PRP is also a
secure PRF; therefore PRPraw is a classically-secure PRF. So we only need to prove this for PRFmod.
Recall that PRFmod(k,a)(x) = PRP
raw
k ((x−1) mod a+1). We first show that if the PRPraw in the definition
of PRFmod were replaced by a truly random function, then no classical polynomial-time algorithm A could
distinguish it from a truly random function. That is,∣∣∣∣ Pr
f←XX ,a←A
[Af mod a() = 1]− Pr
f←XX
[Af () = 1]
∣∣∣∣ < ε, (21)
where f mod a(x) := f((x− 1) mod a+ 1).
Clearly, as long as A never queries its oracle on two points x and x′ such that x ≡ x′ (mod a), the
oracle will look random. Suppose A makes q queries in total. There are
(
q
2
)
possible differences between
query points, and each difference is at most N . So for large enough N , each difference can be divisible
by at most two different moduli from A (recall that each number in A lies in [
√
N/4,
√
N/2]). And since
|A| ≥ Ω(
√
N/ logN), the total probability of querying two x and x′ such that x ≡ x′ (mod a) is at most
O
(
q2 logN√
N
)
,
which is negligible as N is exponential in n. This implies (21).
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Now, since PRPraw is a classically-secure PRF, for any polynomial-time algorithm A, we have∣∣∣∣ Pr
f←XX ,a←A
[Af mod a() = 1]− Pr
f←PRPrawKraw ,a←A
[Af mod a() = 1]
∣∣∣∣ < ε, (22)
since otherwise we can directly construct a distinguisher between PRPrawKraw and XX .
Note that
Pr
f←PRPrawKraw ,a←A
[Af mod a() = 1] = Pr
f←PRFmodKmod
[Af () = 1]
by their definitions. Hence, (21) and (22) together imply that∣∣∣∣∣ Prf←PRFmodKmod [Af () = 1]− Prf←XX [Af () = 1]
∣∣∣∣∣ < ε
for any polynomial-time algorithm A. This completes the proof for the first statement.
Quantum algorithm for recovering a given oracle access to PRFmodKmod . Let (k, a) ← Kmod, f =
PRFmod(k,a) and g = PRP
raw
k . From the definitions, we have f = g mod a.
Since g is a permutation, there is no collision (x, x′) such that g(x) = g(x′). Moreover, in this case,
f = g mod a has a unique period a. Therefore, we can apply Boneh and Lipton’s quantum period-finding al-
gorithm [BL95] to recover a. Using a polynomial number of repetitions, we can make the failure probability
negligible, which completes the proof for the second statement.
Quantum algorithm for distinguishing PRPraw and PRFmod. Finally, we show the above algorithm
implies a good quantum distinguisher between PRPraw and PRFmod. Given oracle access to a function f ,
our distinguisher A tries to recover a period a using the previously discussed algorithm, and accepts only if
f(1) = f(1 + a).
When f ← PRPrawKraw , note that f is a permutation, which means A accepts with probability 0 in this
case.
On the other side, when f ← PRFmodKmod , from the second statement, A can recover the period a with
probability at least 1− ε. Therefore A accepts with probability at least 1− ε.
Combining, we find that A is a distinguisher with advantage 1− ε, and this completes the proof for the
last statement.
E Numerical Simulation For Conjecture 1
Recall Conjecture 1, which said that a random quantum circuit C on n qubits satisfies adv(C) ≥ Cthr − ε
with probability 1− 1/ exp(n), where
Cthr :=
1 + ln 2
2
.
We first explain where the magic number Cthr comes from. Suppose C is drawn from µ2
n
Haar instead of
µgrid. Then C|0n〉 is a random quantum state, and therefore the values 2n · |〈x|C|0〉|’s, for each x ∈ {0, 1}n
are distributed very closely to 2n i.i.d. exponential distributions with λ = 1.
So, assuming that, we can see that the median of probList(C|0〉) concentrates around ln 2, as∫ ln 2
0
dxe−x =
1
2
,
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Figure 2: A histogram of (normalized) probList(C|0〉), where C ← µ16,256grid . The x-axis represents the prob-
ability, and the y-axis represents the estimated density, and the red line indicates the PDF of the exponential
distribution with λ = 1.
which also implies that adv(C) concentrates around∫ +∞
ln 2
xe−xdx = Cthr =
1 + ln 2
2
≈ 0.846574.
In the following, we first provide some numerical evidence that the values in probList(C|0〉) also be-
have like exponentially distributed random variables, which explains why the constant should indeed be
Cthr. Then we provide a direct numerical simulation for the distribution of adv(C) to argue that adv(C)
approximately follows a nice normal distribution. Finally we examine the decreasing rate of the standard
variance of adv(C) to support our conjecture.
E.1 Numerical Simulation Setting
In the following we usually set n = 9 or n = 16 (so that
√
n is an integer); and we always set m = n2 as in
Conjecture 1.
E.2 Distribution of probList(C|0〉) : Approximate Exponential Distribution
In Figure 2 we plot the histogram of the distribution of the normalized probabilities in probList(C|0〉) where
C ← µ16,256grid , that is,
{2n · p : p ∈ probList(C|0〉)}.
And we compare it with the exponential distribution with λ = 1. From Figure 2, it is easy to observe that
these two distributions are quite similar.
E.3 Distribution of adv(C) : Approximate Normal Distribution
Next we perform direct numerical simulation to see how adv(C) is distributed whenC ← µn,mgrid . Our results
suggest that adv(C) approximately follows a normal distribution with mean close to Cthr.
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Figure 3: A histogram of the adv(C)’s of the 105 i.i.d. samples from µ9,81grid . The x-axis represents the value
of adv(C), and the y-axis represents the estimated density, and the red line indicates the PDF of the normal
distribution N (0.846884, 0.008139112).
E.3.1 µ9,81grid , 10
5 samples
We first draw 105 i.i.d. samples from µ9,81grid and plot the distribution of the corresponding adv(C)’s in
Figure 3. From Figure 3, we can see that the distribution of adv(C) follows a nice normal distribution, with
mean very close to Cthr.
E.3.2 µ16,256grid , 10
5 samples
Next, we draw 105 i.i.d. samples from µ16,256grid and plot the distribution of the corresponding adv(C)’s in
Figure 4. From Figure 4, we can observe that the distribution of adv(C) in this case also mimics a nice
normal distribution, with mean even closer to Cthr than in the previous case.
E.4 The Empirical Decay of Variance
The previous subsection suggests that adv(C) follows a normal distribution with mean approaching Cthr. If
that’s indeed the case, then informally, Conjecture 1 becomes equivalent to the conjecture that the variance
σ of Cthr becomes O(1/n) as n → +∞. So we wish to verify the latter conjecture for µn,n
2
grid with some
numerical simulation.
The circuit distribution µn,mgeneral
Unfortunately, the definition of µn,mgrid requires n to be a perfect square, and there are only five perfect squares
for which we can perform quick simulations (n ∈ {1, 4, 9, 16, 25}). So we consider the following distribu-
tion µn,mgeneral on n qubits and m circuits instead: each of m gates is a Haar random two-qubit gate acting on
two qubits chosen uniformly at random. In this case, since we don’t need to arrange the qubits in a square
grid, n can be any positive integer.
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Figure 4: A histogram of the adv(C)’s of the 105 i.i.d. samples from µ16,256grid . The x-axis represents the
value of adv(C), the y-axis represents the estimated density, and the red line indicates the PDF of the
normal distribution N (0.846579, 0.0007125712).
Numerical simulation shows that adv(C) is distributed nearly the same when C is drawn from µn,n
2
general
or µn,n
2
grid for n = 3 or n = 4, so it is reasonable to consider µgeneral instead of µgrid.
For each n = 2, 3, . . . , 16, we draw 1000 i.i.d. samples from µn,n
2
general, and calculate the variance of the
corresponding adv(C)’s. The results are summarized in Figure 5.
From Figure 5, we can observe that the variance decreases faster than the inverse function 1/x; hence it
supports Conjecture 1.
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Figure 5: The empirical decay of the variance of adv(C). Here a point (x, y) means that the standard
variance of the corresponding adv(C)’s for the 1000 i.i.d. samples from µx,x
2
general is y. Also, the red line
represents the function y = 0.1/x.
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